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THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE FLIGHT
FROM FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE:
JUSTICE BREYER'S NEW BALANCING APPROACH
Jerome A. Barron*
Contemporary FirstAmendment issues in cases involving the electronic media transcend traditionalconflicts between the government
and the speaker. The speaker is not easy to identify. Listeners, programmer and medium operators or distributorsall have competing
claims to FirstAmendment protection. To determine whose interests
shall prevail, courts increasingly seek a methodology that accounts
for these warring interests. Justice Breyer, along with Justice Souter
and, in some respects,Justice Stevens, have been instrumental in reviving balancingas a FirstAmendment approachin these situations.
In two recent FirstAmendment cable television cases Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner II) (1997), and Denver Area
Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC (Denver
Area) (1996), JusticeBreyer has written influential opinions that use
this new balancingtest. Traditionalbalancingapproachesfocused on
balancing the interest of government againstthe interest of the media
owner. The new balancing casts a wider net and recognizes that, in
the contemporaryelectronic media context, many speech interests seek
access The new balancinganalysis does not give primacy to one interest over another,but instead seeks to account for the multiplicity of
interests and to weigh the relative strength of the competing access
interests In short, the new balancing analysis highlights the entire
gamut of interestsin play.

INTRODUCTION

The advent of new media necessarily changes the meaning
and applicability of the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses.
The distribution and audience penetration characteristics of
new media have complicated legal responses to problems such
as access, indecency, and obscenity. Contemporary First
Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University Law
School; B.A. 1955, Tufts University; J.D. 1958, Yale University Law School; LL.M.
1960, George Washington University Law School. I would like to thank David Barron for
his comments on this manuscript and Ryan Wallach for both his comments and his excellent research assistance. Thanks also to Tom Dienes for his counsel on the public
forum doctrine.
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Amendment issues transcend conflicts between the government
and the speaker.1 Today, the speaker is not easy to identify.'
Listeners, viewers, programmers, and medium operators all
have competing claims to First Amendment protection, and
their claims are not necessarily fungible.3 To determine whose
interests shall prevail, courts increasingly seek a methodology
that accounts for these competing interests.4 Justice Stephen
Breyer has been instrumental in reviving the balancing approach to First Amendment claims, but his is a new kind of
balancing.5 Justice Breyer's balancing approach focuses on access, not as a right, but as a First Amendment interest worthy
of being weighed in the decisional equation.6
Although Justice Breyer was expected to be a leader in the
fields of administrative and antitrust law, he has additionally
emerged as a major jurist on First Amendment issues, in part
because of his balancing approach. He has been particularly
influential in cases involving the dynamic electronic media,
specifically in the field of cable television.7 A recurring issue
addressed by Justice Breyer is whether there should be a precise First Amendment standard by which to evaluate cable
regulations or whether the present state of cable is still

1.
See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
2.
See id.
3.
See id.
4.
See id.
5.
See discussion infra Parts I-II.
6.
An example of access as a right is seen in Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969), where the Supreme Court held that access to expression rights of
the listeners and viewers trumped the editorial autonomy rights of the broadcaster.
See id. at 390 ("It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."). Justice Breyer, on the other hand, spins viewers' need
for information from a right to an interest. For example, in Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997) (Turner II), the concern for providing the
noncable public with access to over-the-air television is discussed as a First Amendment interest, which is weighed against other competing First Amendment interests.
See id. at 1203-05 (Breyer, J., concurring). Similarly, in Denver Area EducationalTelecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (DenverArea), Justice
Breyer balances cable programmers' interests in access to channels against cable
operators' interests in editorial control over their wires. See id. at 743-44.
7.
See, e.g., Turner 11, 117 S. Ct. at 1203-05 (Breyer, J., concurring in part); Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 743-47 (1996). Paradoxically, the debate about the nature of First
Amendment protection appropriate for cable regulation may outlive cable as an important medium. Indeed, satellite television appears poised to eclipse cable television
just as cable television eclipsed over-the-air broadcast television. See Brenda Dalglish,
Satellite TVGets Lost in Space, FIN. POST (Toronto), Sept. 13, 1997, at 13.

SUMMER

1998]

The ElectronicMedia

819

evolving in nature and does not warrant the selection of a general standard.8
In two recent First Amendment cable television cases,
Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC (Turner II) 9 and Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC (DenverArea), ° Justice Breyer wrote influential opinions
using a new First Amendment balancing test." The significance of his opinions is in their caution, sensitivity to the
changing media environment, and detachment from the demands of existing First Amendment doctrine. 12 Existing First
See, e.g., Turner II, 117 S. Ct. at 1204-05 (Breyer, J., concurring in part); Den8.
ver Area, 518 U.S. at 740.
117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997).
9.
518 U.S. 727 (1996).
10.
11.
See supra note 7.
12.
Modern First Amendment doctrine utilizes a number of methodologies. These
range from categorization versus ad hoc balancing to content-based versus contentneutral methodologies. Categorization recognizes categories of speech that are either
unprotected speech under the First Amendment or enjoy something less than full
protection-so-called "low value" speech. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem."). According to Melville Nimmer, categories of speech are
developed by definitional balancing-a general calculus of the competing interests
implicated by government regulation of that category of speech. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to
Libel and Misappliedto Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 942-43 (1968).
An alternative to categorization is ad hoc balancing, where courts balance First
Amendment interests implicated by the facts of a particular case. See, e.g., United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). Ad hoc balancing comes in a variety of
forms that include strict scrutiny review-balancing the compelling government interest in regulation with the effects on the First Amendment rights of the speakerand medium or intermediate scrutiny-upholding a government regulation when "it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest.., and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest." Id. at 377. Strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and
rational basis scrutiny comprise the three-tiered methodology courts currently use for
First Amendment and Equal Protection analysis. See infra note 15 and accompanying
text.
Another First Amendment methodology often utilized in conjunction with categorization and balancing focuses on the distinction between content-based and content-neutral
regulations. See, e.g., Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984) ("Regulations
which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment."). Content-based regulations
are restrictions that are based on what the speaker is saying-the content of the message. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (holding the "Son of Sam" law, which forced publishers to place
income from criminals' books into escrow for the criminals' victims, to be contentbased). Content-neutral regulations are restrictions that may burden First Amendment interests but that are not based upon what the speaker is saying. See Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662-63 (1994) (Turner 1). A high standard is
required to uphold content-based restrictions: "[G]overnment must demonstrate that
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Amendment doctrine, in turn, might hinder the development
of a First Amendment jurisprudence as flexible and adaptable
as the evolving technology that it governs.
Skepticism regarding the rigidity of modern constitutional
law doctrine is not new to the Supreme Court. In R.A.V v.
City of St. Paul,3 Justice Stevens provided a devastating critique of the categorical approach to free expression
problems. 14 Similarly, several Supreme Court Justices have
expressed longstanding skepticism as to the utility of the
three-tiered standard of review in evaluating the First
Amendment validity of governmental regulation. 5 Thus, the
the communication falls into one of the categories of low-value speech or must justify
the regulation by showing that it is necessary to a compelling governmental interest."
JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 28
(1993). When the regulation is deemed to be content-neutral, then courts will use a
less stringent balancing test. See Turner I, 512 US. at 662.
A recent trend in First Amendment jurisprudence has been the application of the
public forum doctrine, see International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,
505 U.S. 672, 672 (1992), and its application to new media, see Denver Area, 518 U.S.
at 791-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The public forum
doctrine stems from the belief that traditional public places, such as streets and
parks, are "a public forum that the citizen can commandeer." Harry Kalven, Jr., The
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 11-12. Although
a citizen's right of access to a traditional public forum is guaranteed, the government
is permitted to impose time, place, and manner restrictions on the forum's use, provided the regulations do not discriminate based on the speaker's content. See
InternationalSoc'y, 505 U.S. at 678-79. A more significant question the U.S. Supreme
Court addressed was what government-owned or government-controlled property
would constitute a public forum and how public fora were created. See id. (analyzing
whether an airport terminal was a public forum). A finding that property is a traditional public forum or a designated public forum, a forum that the government has
opened for expressive activity, subjects the government regulation to strict scrutiny
analysis unless the regulation is a time, place, or manner restriction. See id. at 678
("[Riegulation of speech on government property that has traditionally been available
for public expression is subject to the highest scrutiny.").
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
13.
14.
Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated:
But this approach sacrifices subtlety for clarity and is, I am convinced, ultimately unsound. As an initial matter, the concept of "categories" fits poorly with
the complex reality of expression. Few dividing lines in First Amendment law
are straight and unwavering, and efforts at categorization inevitably give rise
only to fuzzy boundaries. Our definitions of "obscenity," and "public forum," illustrate this all too well. The quest for doctrinal certainty through the
definition of categories and subcategories is, in my opinion, destined to fail.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
See id.; Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Simi15.
larly, in the Equal Protection area, Justice Marshall challenged the standards of
review in his dissent in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall criticized the
Rodriguez majority for adhering to strict categories. "The Court apparently seeks to
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categories of expression may be honored more in cases of
breach than in cases of observance. Only recently, in Glickman
v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott,6 has the Court moved away from
the demands of the commercial speech category and the Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
of New York 7 test by referring to the regulation at issue as
traditional economic regulation. 8 Such a characterization
thereby allowed the regulation to be measured by the deferential rational basis test.'9
Justice Breyer's balancing approach differs from existing
First Amendment doctrine. A balancing of interests methodology was the Supreme Court's dominant approach to First
Amendment issues in the 1950s and 1960s."° Although Justice
Breyer's new balancing approach is somewhat different, the
historical virtues and defects of a balancing approach remain.2 '
For example, the balancing approach's lack of predictability
and precision make it attractive and adaptable to the unsettled issues created by new and poorly understood media
technologies. The fact that Justice Breyer's balancing approach
deems access to be a First Amendment interest does not necessarily require that the access interest prevail. Instead,
such an interest might be useful in resuscitating a balancing

establish today that equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which
dictate the appropriate standard of review-strict scrutiny or mere rationality." Id. at
98 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, however, recognized that flexibility in
constitutional standards is necessary depending on the context of each case. "A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of
standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall believed that the
severity of the review should increase depending upon the importance and proximity
of the interest affected to a constitutional right. Justice Marshall stated that it was
"inescapably clear that [the] Court has consistently adjusted the care with which it
will review state discrimination in light of the constitutional significance of the interests affected and the invidiousness of the particular classification." Id. at 109
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
16. 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
17. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). For a discussion of the Central Hudson test, see infra
note 118.
18. See Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2142 ("In sum, what we are reviewing is a species
of economic regulation that should enjoy the same strong presumption of validity that
we accord to other policy judgments made by Congress.").
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501-02, 508-10 (employing
balancing in both a facial and as-applied First Amendment challenge to the Smith
Act, which prohibited advocating the overthrow of the United States government)
(1951); discussion infra note 30 and accompanying text.
21. See discussion infra note 26.
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approach for Supreme Court forays into new communications
technologies.
Traditional balancing approaches weigh the interest of government against the interest of a speaker. 2 Justice Breyer's
balancing analysis, on the other hand, accounts for a multiplicity of
interests and refuses to grant any interests special
3
weight.
As we shall see, the use of a balancing test in the Denver
Area opinions does not necessarily signify a general revival of
the balancing test in First Amendment law.24 The balancing
in Denver Area is a special kind of balancing, as Justice
Breyer and Justice Souter do not espouse balancing as the
best of doctrinal tools to solve First Amendment issues. Instead, they espouse balancing as a default doctrinal choice
for the novel and difficult problems presented by the interface of First Amendment law and new communications
technologies.25
The balancing chapter in the history of First Amendment
doctrine has been, and continues to be, a controversial one.26
22.
See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126-29 (1959) (upholding
the contempt conviction of a university professor who refused to disclose whether he
was a member of the Communist Party); Dennis, 341 U.S. at 516-17 (upholding the
Smith Act convictions of Communist Party members).
23.
See discussion infra Part I.
24.
See discussion infra Part II.
25.
See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 740-41 ("The history of this Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence, however, is one of continual development ....
Over the
years, this Court has restated and refined these basic First Amendment principles,
adopting them more particularly to the balance of competing interests and the special
circumstances of each field of application.").
26.
An early debate about the merits of First Amendment balancing is that between Laurent Frantz and Professor Wallace Mendelson. See Laurent Frantz, The
First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962) [hereinafter Frantz, The
FirstAmendment]; Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821 (1962).
Frantz threw the following grenade at the use of a balancing approach in a First
Amendment context: "The ad hoc balancer's constitution is empty until the court decides what to put into it. It does not speak until the court speaks for it. It is inherently
incapable of saying anything to the judge." Frantz, The First Amendment, supra, at
1435.
Professor Mendelson responded that absent a balancing approach, judges could
hide their individual and personal rationales for an opinion in the cloak of the Constitution. See Mendelson, supra, at 825. Balancing compelled a judge to provide "a
particularized, rational account of how he arrives at [his decisions]-more particularized and more rational at least than the familiar parade of hallowed abstractions,
elastic absolutes, and selective history." Id. at 825. Doubting Mendelson's impartiality
argument, Frantz criticized balancing because of its inability to quantify which interests weigh more heavily. See Laurent Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply
to Professor Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. REV. 729, 748-49 (1963) [hereinafter Frantz, A
Reply]. In addition, balancing provides no reassurance to the losing party that "the
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The balancing approach had its detractors from the outset,
and its advocates were not the most sensitive of First Amendment critics.27 Consider the following endorsement of the
balancing test from a legal educator in the 1960s, Professor
Charles Nutting, in an article significantly entitled Is the First
Amendment Obsolete?:
Actually "balancing" is the very essence of judging, because in every case there must be a determination of
which of two or more conflicting interests will prevail. In
private litigation, it may be the interest each litigant has
or claims to have in a particular piece of property. Where
government is involved usually a social interest, such as
that in safety, conflicts with an individual interest such as
speech. It seems much more realistic to recognize this to
judge succeeded in keeping his personal preferences out of his 'scales.'" Id. at 749. In a
surrebuttal from which the analysis of Justices Breyer and Souter in the Denver Area
case could take comfort, Professor Mendelson observed: "The need for judicial balancing, I suggest, results from the imperfection of mundane law. In a better world, no
doubt, clear and precise legal rules would anticipate all possible contingencies." Wallace Mendelson, The FirstAmendment and the Judicial Process:A Reply to Mr. Frantz,
17 VAND. L. REV. 479, 484 (1964).
More recently, balancing and its persistence in constitutional law generally is criticized in T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943 (1987). In Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword, Implementing the Constitution,
111 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1997), balancing is defended against the charge byProfessor
Aleinikoff and others that there is no "objective, external 'scale of values' upon which
to weigh the competing interests." Id. at 79 n.133. Professor Fallon suggests that such
criticism misunderstands the role of a balancing approach. See id. at 80.
Professor Fallon contends that balancing should be thought of as a "metaphor for
... decision processes that call for consideration of the relative significance of a diverse array of potentially relevant factors." Id. (footnote omitted). It is the thesis of
this Article that this highlighting of the relevant factors or, in a First Amendment
context, the rivalrous First Amendment interests, is exactly the use to which Justice
Breyer puts his balancing approach in Turner II and DenverArea.
The foregoing appreciation and revival of balancing is not without its critics. Professor Post has observed that it is an "unfortunate consequence of the metaphor of
balancing" that the result of First Amendment cases can be viewed "as a compromise
between competing interests." Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine,
47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1280 (1995). Instead he contends that often the issue to be
decided "is what social practice ought to be legally recognized in a particular context."
Id. Arguably, it is precisely this latter endeavor which Justice Breyer's new balancing
undertakes.
I propose that Justice Breyer's new balancing implicitly recognizes that a balancing
approach is a particularly subtle means for accomodating changes in new media. Balancing is malleable because one can always add to or subtract from the interests that
are weighed. New technologies are evolutionary in nature, thus creating new interests
that need to be accounted for by the First Amendment. These new interests cannot be
injected into nonpliant structured doctrine; rather, these interests are best accounted
for by throwing them into the balancing pot.
27.
See supra note 26.
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be the case than to rely on formulae which merely conceal
the true situation.2 8
Balancing did not survive the McCarthy era with a positive
reputation. Purporting to weigh objectively important liberty
and security interests when applying the balancing test, courts
too often placed security over liberty.29 Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence in Dennis v. United States provides a paradigm of
the flaws of the balancing test of that time. 30 The opinion was
Gitlow v. New York resurrected. 3' The statute was validated
provided the legislative judgment balancing the interests was
deemed reasonable, 32 and balancing began to be seen as a doc3
trinal tool for speech repression.
The significance of Justice Breyer's use of a balancing approach in Denver Area is more evident when compared to the
general balancing test which served as the standard doctrinal
tool in First Amendment law a generation ago. In his magisterial The System of Freedom of Expression, Professor Thomas
Emerson summarized that balancing test: "[Bleginning with
Douds in 1950, the Court turned primarily to the ad hoc balancing test. The balancing test was used extensively for a
decade and a half, at first with the legislative judgment given
special weight and later with the First Amendment interest
gaining the preference. " '
28.
Charles B. Nutting, Is the FirstAmendment Obsolete?, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
167, 173-74(1961).
29.
See Aleinikoff, supra note 26, at 944.
30.
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517-56 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Justice Frankfurter asserts that the balancing of interests should be done
by Congress and not the Court. See id. at 525 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice
Frankfurter states:
Absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and such exceptions would eventually corrode the rules. The demands of free speech in a
democratic society as well as the interest in national security are better served
by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the
non-Euclidian problems to be solved.
Id. at 524-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
31.
268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925) ("U]tterances inciting to the overthrow of organized
government by unlawful means, present a sufficient danger of substantive evil to
bring their punishment within the range of legislative discretion ....
[T]he immediate
danger is none the less real and substantial, because the effect of a given utterance
cannot be accurately foreseen.").
32.
See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 501.
33.
See discussion supra note 26.
34.
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 717 (1970).
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The balancing test used by Justice Breyer, and praised by
Justice Souter, is significantly different. In this new balancing
approach, a legislative judgment in favor of access is ferreted
out and given weight, as in Turner H." As discussion of Denver
Area illustrates, a governmental interest in suppression of expression is given less weight."
In an even more modern context, balancing has reappeared
regarding indecency in the newly emergent electronic media.
In The System of Freedom of Expression, Professor Emerson
noted that the balancing test had never been suggested as a
suitable doctrine or test for evaluating First Amendment
challenges to obscenity regulation." Professor Emerson observed that this may be "attributable to the fact that the
balancing test is particularly unworkable because the interests of the state in prohibiting obscenity rest upon such
unascertainable foundations."38 In this light, it is surprising to
see balancing, whether weighted towards interests or not, revived for use in the indecency context in electronic media
cases. The return of balancing, however, is driven by a renewed
concern for access interests, rather than indecency issues, in
electronic media cases."
Part I of this Article discusses Thrner H and focuses on Justice Breyer's development of a balancing analysis in that case.
Part II discusses the Denver Area decision in which Justice
Breyer, writing in part the opinion of the Court, again uses a
balancing approach in order to resolve the competing First
Amendment interests affected by the regulation of indecency
on leased access and public access channels. This Part also
considers how the new balancing approach uniquely weighs
the access for expression aspect of a regulation against its
speech suppressive aspect. Part III analyzes the varying reactions of the other Justices, specifically Justices Souter,
Stevens, Kennedy, and Thomas, to the new balancing approach. Part IV considers the new balancing approach in
contexts other than cable regulation. The vehicle for consideration is an Internet case, Reno v. ACLU,40 involving the
application of First Amendment rights to a new medium. This
Part concludes that although the new balancing analysis was
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See discussion infra Part I.
See discussion infra Part II.
See EMERSON, supra note 34, at 494.
Id.
See discussion infra Part IVA, C.
117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
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not explicitly relied on in Reno, its approach is consistent with
the results in Denver Area and Turner I. Namely, where the
Court finds that the function of regulation is to preserve access,
the Court is not inclined to disturb the regulation. The conclusion provides an overview of the new balancing approach and
highlights the emphasis on the competing First Amendment
interests of the various players over the interest of the owner
of the medium.

I. THE SECOND TURNER CASE
The Turner cases considered the difficult First Amendment
issues presented by the so-called "must-carry" provisions enacted in sections four and five of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (1992 Cable
Act).4 The must-carry provisions obligate cable television system operators to carry local commercial and noncommercial
broadcast signals.42 The Supreme Court considered First
Amendment challenges to the must-carry rules twice in the
last three years."
The lower federal courts have puzzled over the must-carry
issue for an even longer time." These lower court decisions
Pub. L. No. 102-385, §§ 4-5, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471-88 (1992) (codified as
41.
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (1994)). Sections four and five of the 1992 Cable Act
amended the Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act), (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (1994)). Within the Communications Act, the mustcarry provisions are labeled as sections 614 and 615. To avoid numerical confusion,
this Article will refer to the must-carry provisions by the section numbers designated
in the United States Code, sections 534 and 535.
42.
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535. Section 534 requires cable operators to carry "local
commercial television stations," which are defined by subsection (h) to include "any
full power television broadcast station, other than a qualified noncommercial educational television station within the meaning of section [535]" that operates within the
same television market as a cable system. Id. § 534. Section 535 imposes similar requirements for local "noncommercial educational television stations." Id. § 535. For
example, if a cable operator provides forty channels of television and there are four
local over-the-air broadcasters that qualify for must-carry status, the cable operator
would be forced to place the broadcasters on four out of its forty channels. The result
is that the cable operator is only permitted to choose the programming it desires for
thirty-six channels. For a complete discussion of the must-carry requirements, an
outline of the 1992 Cable Act, and Congress's purpose in adopting the 1992 Cable Act,
see Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 630-34.
43.
See Turner II, 117 S. Ct. 1174; Turner1, 512 U.S. 622.
See, e.g., Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 304-05 (D.C.
44.
Cir. 1987) (holding unconstitutional the must-carry rules that were revised by the
FCC in response to Quincy); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1463 (D.C.
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responded to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) attempts to enforce must-carry provisions by adopting agency
rules45 rather than, as in Thrner, by statute. Utilizing the test
formulated in United States v. O'Brien," these rules were invalidated in Quincy Cable TV,Inc. v. FCC in 1985,"' and
Cir. 1985) (holding that the must-carry rules, as then drafted and justified by the FCC,
violated the First Amendment rights of cable operators).
See Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Sig45.
nals to Community Antenna Systems, Domestic Public Point-ta-Point Microwave
Radio Service for Microwave Stations Used to Relay Television Broadcast Signals to
Community Antenna Television Systems, 38 F.C.C. 683, 713-14 (1965) [hereinafter
First Report & Order] (adoption of rules & regulations); Business Radio Service for
Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, Domestic Public Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Service for Microwave Stations Used to
Relay Television Broadcast Signals to Community Antenna Television Systems, Distribution of Television Broadcast Signals by Community Antenna Television Systems,
2 F.C.C.2d 725, 746-47 (1966) [hereinafter Second Report & Order] (adoption of rules
& regulations). The FCC originally imposed must-carry requirements on microwave
systems used to transmit distant broadcast signals to a rural cable system. See Carter
Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465 (1962), affd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.
1963). In 1966, these requirements were imposed on all cable systems that carried at
least one broadcast signal, regardless of whether the signal was transmitted via microwave. See Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d at 752-53.
The FCC's objective in implementing must-carry was not only to protect the interests of broadcasters but also to guarantee that it met one of its "cardinal objectives:
the development of a 'system of [free] local broadcasting stations, such that all communities of appreciable size [will] have at least one television station as an outlet for
local self-expression.'" Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1439 (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 US. 157, 174 (1968)). The FCC's original
must-carry rules required cable operators to carry all broadcast channels that met the
Commission's definition of local-in general, "signals of all commercial television stations within 35 miles of the community served by the system, other stations in the
same television market (as designated by the Commission), and all stations
'significantly viewed in the community.' "Id. at 1440 n.12 (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.5, .51,
.53, .55, .57, .59, .61 (1984)). The rules did not limit the number of must-carry channels, regardless of a cable operator's capacity. See id. at 1440.
The D.C. Circuit decisions overruling the FCC's must-carry rules led to Congressional intervention on behalf of broadcasters and over-the-air viewers.
46.
391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien test allows the government to regulate
speech if: 1) "it is within the constitutional power of the Government"; 2) the regulation "furthers an important or substantial governmental interest"; 3) "the government
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression" (i.e., it is content-neutral);
and 4) "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 377.
47.
See Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1437, 1459, 1463. In Quincy, the D.C. Circuit rejected
the argument that cable television should be subject to the same First Amendment
standard as over-the-air broadcasting. See id. at 1448-49. Instead, the Quincy court
analyzed whether the government regulation incidentally burdened speech or
whether the regulation was intended to ban speech either directly because of its content or "'indirectly by favoring certain classes of speakers.'" Id. at 1450 (quoting Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Although the D.C. Circuit
expressed uncertainty about whether must-carry only incidentally burdened speech, it
decided to apply the O'Brien level of scrutiny. See id. at 1454-55.
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revised rules were invalidated in Century Communications
Corp. v. FCC in 1987.4"
Justice Breyer's concurrence in Trner H displays the
unique characteristics of his evolving First Amendment standard: caution, sensitivity to new technology, and detachment
from the confines of existing First Amendment doctrine."9 In
analyzing the must-carry rules, Justice Breyer, unlike the D.C.
Circuit, ignored the distinction between content-based and
content-neutral regulations. 50 Justice Breyer focused on the
consequences of cable television on over-the-air television and
the impact of these consequences on First Amendment interests.5 Must-carry is a response to cable television's penetration
of the television viewing market.52 Today, over sixty percent of
American homes receive television programming through
Judge Wright's analysis in Quincy is couched in cautious language that attempts to
account for the unique features of cable television. See id. at 1448. Judge Wright expressly refused to adopt a specific standard for cable television, see id. at 1454; he did,
however, compare cable to other media and noted similarities and differences. See id.
at 1450-53. Judge Wright declared that the "'differences in the characteristics of
[cable] justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied.'" Quincy, 768
F.2d at 1448 (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)).
In the end, Judge Wright utilized the content-based versus content-neutral methodology. In other words, he reverted to existing First Amendment doctrine, an
approach Justice Breyer more recently rejected. See discussion supraIntroduction.
See Century, 835 F.2d at 292. In Century, the D.C. Circuit held that the FCC's
48.
attempts to revise the must-carry rules still did not satisfy the O'Brien test. See id. at
293. Instead of setting forth a First Amendment standard for the regulation of cable,
the Century court again sidestepped this issue by relying on O'Brien. See id. at 298.
See Turner II, 117 S. Ct. at 1203-05 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). Dissatis49.
faction with the existing or dominant First Amendment doctrine of an era is hardly a
new phenomenon. The late Professor Melville Nimmer dealt the ad hoc balancing of
his time a heavy blow in his paper advocating definitional rather than ad hoc balancing. See Nimmer, supra note 12, at 942-43 ([T]he Court employs balancing not for the
purpose of determining which litigant deserves to prevail in the particular case, but
only for the purpose of defining which forms of speech are to be regarded as 'speech'
within the meaning of the first amendment."). Professor Schlag's penetrating critique
of the categorical approach to free expression problems was similarly severe. See Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Expression, 30
UCLA L. REv. 671, 695-96 (1983) ("[A] categorical theory which is appealing because
it appears to compel results in concrete cases will not gain adherence because its
normative boundaries will be too narrow."). A more recent and even more encompassing critique of First Amendment doctrine is found in Post, supra note 26, at 1250
(noting that modern First Amendment doctrine is superficial, internally incoherent,
and fails to "facilitate constructive judicial engagement with significant contemporary
social issues ,connected with freedom of speech"). Whether the balancing approach of
Justice Breyer in the cable cases succeeds or not, I think the objective of that approach is engagement with contemporary social issues, or at least contemporary
communications issues.
See Turner 11, 117 S. Ct. at 1204-05 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
50.
See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
51.
See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 663.
52.
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subscriptions to cable television systems."3 Approximately
thirty percent of American homes today, in turn, receive their
television programming by virtue of over-the-air television
signals.'
In Thrner II, Justice Breyer was not troubled by whether or
not the preference for local service programming is contentbased.5 Instead, adopting a pragmatic First Amendment instrumentalism, he acknowledged the First Amendment costs
of must-carry rules. 6 Indeed, he was candid enough to concede
that these First Amendment costs constitute a suppression of
speech.5 7 For Justice Breyer, however, suppression of speech
with must-carry was not decisive; instead, Justice Breyer
rested his decision on the idea that assuring public access to a
variety of information sources was a central First Amendment
value. 8
Using a balancing approach which focused on the context of
the situation, Justice Breyer weighed the First Amendment
53.
See Dalglish, supra note 7, at 13. The FinancialPost reported that there were
96.9 million homes with TVs, 63.7 million that subscribed to cable and 30 million that
could subscribe to cable but do not. See id. In addition, there are 3.2 million homes
that are unable to subscribe to cable. See id.
54.
See id.; Turner H, 117 S. Ct. at 1190.
55.
Professor Cass Sunstein has praised and explained Justice Breyer's decision
to avoid the content-based versus content-neutral dichotomy in Turner II: "Breyer
says the First Amendment is basically about democracy. Even content-based regulation can make democracy work better. Breyer doesn't allow himself to be trapped by
the categories of 'content-based' and 'content-neutral.'" Dan Trigoboff, What Price
Must Carry?: Some Say Decision Strengthens Government's Role in Regulating TV,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 7, 1997, at 30 (quoting Cass Sunstein). Justice Breyer
saw must-carry as enhancing expression more than it restricted it. See generally
Turner II, 117 S. Ct. at 1203-05 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). Justice O'Connor, dissenting in Turner I, thought that one of the objectives of the must-carry obligations of
the 1992 Cable Act was to preserve local service programming. See Turner 1, 512 U.S.
at 675-77 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). From a First Amendment point of view, however,
she did not think this was a virtue. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Such an objective, she believed, constituted a content-based justification and therefore violated the
First Amendment. See id. at 678-79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
56.
See Turner II, 117 S. Ct. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) ("I do not
deny that the compulsory carriage that creates the 'guarantee' extracts a serious First
Amendment price.').
57.
See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part) ("[Compulsory carriage] interferes with
the protected interests of the cable operators to choose their own programming; it
prevents displaced cable program providers from obtaining an audience; and it will
sometimes prevent some cable viewers from watching what, in its absence, would
have been their preferred set of programs. This 'price' amounts to a 'suppression of
speech.'" (citation omitted)).
58.
See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part) ("Indeed, Turner rested in part upon
the proposition that 'assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values
central to the First Amendment.'" (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 663)).
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costs to the cable operator, the cable programmer, the over-theair programmer, and the viewer.5 9 For example, must-carry can
override cable operators who wish to control the programming
on their systems, deprive cable programmers of the audience
they would otherwise have, and trump the programming
choices of cable viewers. 60 In addition, countervailing First
Amendment interests exist, such as the preservation of free
over-the-air television for over-the-air viewers. 1 One reason
for preservation, in the words of Justice Breyer, is to prevent
"too precipitous a decline in the quality and quantity of programming choice for an ever-shrinking non-cable-subscribing
segment of the public." 2 After weighing the "speech-restricting
and speech-enhancing consequences" of must-carry, however,
Justice Breyer concluded that the burden must-carry imposes
on the cable system operator, potential cable programmers,
and cable viewers is insubstantial when compared to the severe burden upon the over-the-air viewer.63 The programming
options of the cable subscriber are much more varied than the
limited ones of the non-cable subscribing over-the-air viewer.'
In essence, Justice Breyer concluded that Congress could reasonably determine that must-carry aids the over-the-air
viewer more than it hurts the cable subscriber.' Under such
circumstances, the First Amendment did66 not require a preference for the interests of the cable viewer.
In defining the interests to be balanced, Justice Breyer
looked to the consequences of cable television on over-the-air
broadcasters,6 7 and his analysis identified at least three important consequences which would result from cable besting overthe-air broadcasting.

59.
See id. at 1204-05 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (analyzing the "proper fit"
of the government regulation to see if it "strikes a reasonable balance between potentially speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences").
60.
See id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
61.
See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
62.
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
63.
See id. at 1204-05 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
64.
See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
65.
See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
66.
See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
67.
See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
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A. The Economic Impact of Cable on Local
Over-the-Air Broadcasting
Unless cable systems carry their signals, the economic viability of over-the-air broadcasters is threatened." Advertisers
aware of the fragmentation of the television market in a community will be less willing to pay traditional advertising rates.
In addition, the traditionally small audiences of local over-theair public broadcasters may become so small without a presence
on the local cable system's channels as to become nonviable."
Consequently, the ability of local over-the-air viewers to receive
so-called "free" television will be destroyed.
An understandable reaction to these contentions is to dismiss them in the name of technology, as one media technology
is inevitably rendered obsolete by another. Over-the-air television overtook radio. Cable television overtook over-the-air
television. Satellite television now threatens the penetration of
cable television. Law, including constitutional law, should not
block the path of technological and economic change. This response, however, ignores social and economic barriers which
prevent the members of certain economic classes from utilizing
the new media. Thus, the demise of free over-the-air television
would result in a further divide between those who can afford
access to information via cable and satellite subscription services and those who cannot.°

68.
See Brief for Intervenor-Appellees Consumer Federation of America, et al.,
Turner II, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997) (No. 95-992), available in 1996 WL 422149, at *5-6
("Without access to a substantial cable audience, local broadcasters may be unfairly
disadvantaged from competing with cable and from attracting the advertising needed
to maintain their economic viability"); Brief for Appellees-Intervenors Association of
America's Public Television Stations, et al., Turner 11, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997) (No. 95992), available in 1996 WL 432279, at *15 ("Congress was concerned that, by virtue of
their bottleneck monopoly, cable operators were in a position to destroy the viability of
a substantial portion of the industry, depriving viewers of the benefits of broadcast
television, in all of its varied forms.").
69.
See Brief for Appellees-Intervenors Association of America's Public Television
Stations, et al., Turner H, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997) (No. 95-992), available in 1996 WL
432279, at *14 ("Obviously, Congress regarded public television stations as a segment
of the industry that is particularly vulnerable and that should be preserved in an
economically viable form, regardless of the health of commercial stations.").
70.
See Turner H, 117 S. Ct. at 1187 (discussing Congressional concern with the
disappearance of broadcast television and noting that the issue is "'whether the
broadcast services available to viewers [without cable] ... are likely to be reduced to a
significant extent, because of either loss of some stations altogether or curtailment of
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B. Cable and Local Public Issue Programming
The second potential consequence of the rise of cable television and the declining market for local over-the-air television
is that in the absence of local over-the-air television no entity
will be obligated to provide programming on issues of a local
nature. Under the theory of the Communications Act of 1934,
local over-the-air broadcasters are licensed as trustees for
their communities.' As such, broadcasters have an obligation
to present the community with information on local issues and
controversies.72 Cable operators, in turn, are not hamstrung by
a need to provide the local cable audience with information on
local issues. Indeed, one of the few remaining substantive programming obligations of broadcasters in this era of deregulation
is to present issue-responsive programming to their communities.73
services by others'" (quoting Brief for Federal Appellees, Turner II, 117 S. Ct. 1174
(1997) (No. 95-992), availablein 1996 WL 435560, at *28-29 n.3)).
71.
See 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1994) ("Subject to the provisions of this section, the
Commission shall determine .. . whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the granting of such application.. . ."); 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(k)
(West Supp. 1998) (allowing the FCC to grant a license renewal only if it finds that the
licensee "during the preceding term of its license ... has served the public interest,
convenience, and necessity").
See En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2312 (1960) ("The princi72.
pal ingredient of [the public interest) obligation consists of a diligent, positive and
continuing effort by the licensee to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs and desires of
his service area.").
73.
Despite the broadcasting deregulation of the 1980s, broadcasters still have a
"bedrock obligation" to offer issue-responsive programming. Deregulation of Radio, 84
F.C.C.2d 968, 977, 982 (1981), on reconsideration,87 F.C.C.2d 797 (1981); see also Main
Studio and Local Public Inspection Files of Broadcast Television and Radio Stations,
12 F.C.C.R. 6993 (1997) (rule review); En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. at
2312. In Monroe Communications Corp. v. FCC, 900 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the D.C.
Circuit reversed an FCC decision to renew the license of a Chicago television station,
Video 44. In reversing the FCC license renewal the court stated:
The Commission found that through the full final year of its license term Video
44 offered .08 percent news, 2.57 percent public affairs, and only 5.84 percent
By the very end of its license peother non-entertainment programming ....
riod, Video 44 had scaled back its non-entertainment programming to five
hours per week and had discontinued local production. Given that the license
expectancy analysis focuses on the incumbent licensee's responsiveness to the
ascertained problems and needs of its community, the Commission was arbitrary in awarding Video 44 a renewal expectancy in light of record evidence of a
strong downward trend in Video 44's responsiveness to community needs in the
form of news and non-entertainment programming.
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Whether a broadcaster has provided such programming is a
factor in determining whether the broadcaster has performed
in the public interest, a consideration which affects the FCC's
decision to renew a broadcast license.7 If local over-the-air
broadcasters are not economically viable and go out of business, the obligation to present television programming of
unique local concern to a given community will disappear as
well.
This second justification for must-carry presents delicate
First Amendment issues. If the justification for must-carry is
to provide local issue programming, such a justification seems
content-based.15 And if it is content-based, can such a justification withstand a strict scrutiny standard of review? This issue
was heavily debated in Thrner .76 Justice Kennedy, writing for
the Court, denied that the dominant rationale for must-carry
reflected a preference for local over-the-air programming.7" In
contrast, Justice Stevens' concurrence, which constituted the
critical fifth vote, acknowledged that preservation of local overthe-air programming indeed was one of the justifications for
must-carry."'
C. The Problem of Information Apartheid
By recognizing the interests of over-the-air broadcasting
viewers, Justice Breyer's opinion implicitly takes into account
Id. at 356 (citations omitted).
74.
See 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(k) (West Supp. 1998).
75.
See supra note 12. In Simon & Schuster, Inc. u. Members of the New York
State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991), Justice Kennedy explained the rationale behind the content-based and content-neutral distinction: "[Tihe government's
ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace." Id. at
116.
76.
512 U.S. 622 (1994).
77.
See Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 646-48.
78.
See id. at 669, 672 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring) (acknowledging that the government's interests in protecting "the economic viability of free local broadcast
television and its ability to originate quality local programming" and "assuring the
availability of a 'multiplicity of information sources' are unquestionably substantial").
Justice Stevens focuses on the bottleneck control that cable operators can exert over
programming. See id. at 671 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("It is also clear that cable operators ... have both the ability and the economic incentive to exploit their gatekeeper
status to the detriment of broadcasters."). This bottleneck control affects not only the
local broadcasters' ability to gain access to cable subscribers but also the ability of local
over-the-air viewers to receive free local programming.
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the disparity between people who can afford access to cable
and those who cannot. The problem of information apartheid
stems not only from the rise of cable television, but also from
the advent of the Internet.7" Access to the Internet typically
calls for an initial investment in a personal computer and
some degree of training or skill in using it. Access to cable
television is easier, but it does require a subscriber fee that
may be prohibitive to the poorer segments of society.
The educational and economic barriers to entry presented by
these new media, paradoxically, may destroy access to the older
media. For example, if the market available to local over-the-air
broadcasters is too small to support it, then that substantial
fraction of the public that cannot or will not subscribe to cable
will be left without television. Consequently, that fraction of the
public will be bereft of information on the issues confronting the
local community previously available via local over-the-air
broadcasters.
The Supreme Court has stated that First Amendment jurisprudence does not prefer one set of speakers over another."
Taken literally, this would mean that the government cannot
favor local over-the-air broadcasters over cable operators. Is it
also part of First Amendment jurisprudence to refuse to prefer
one set of viewers over another? Arguably, cable operators and
cable viewers might prefer the Playboy channel or the Fox
channel, FX, to local over-the-air signals. The over-the-air

79.
Information apartheid refers to the disparity in the access to information
that exists between rich and poor, and black and white. The term appears to have
been coined by Congressman Edward Markey (D-Mass.) who "wants to ensure that
the 'tools of the information age will be accessible to every social strata and geographic region of the country and available to school districts and public libraries.'"
Kim McAvoy, Markey's Goal: Two Wires in Every House, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov.
15, 1993, at 26. Numerous commentators have raised a concern that access to computers will become an essential requirement to survive in the job marketplace and
society of the future. See John Eger, LibrariesBridge the Information Gap, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Oct. 30, 1996, at Bl; Felix Gutierrez, King's Legacy vs. Information
Apartheid, PORTLAND SKANNER, Jan. 17, 1996, at 4; Richard M. Krieg, Signed Off Information Apartheid Blocking Black Communities, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 23, 1995, at 15.
Although the focus of most of the literature is on access to computers and the Internet, the information available on television has become significantly more diverse and
informative. See Krieg, supra. The inability of a minority of the nation to receive any
information via free television would create a communications divide among those
who have access and those who do not.
80.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1976); cf CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453
U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (finding no "general right of access to the media"); Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (upholding the Fairness Doctrine, the requirement that both sides of an issue be given equal air time).
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broadcast audience, however, might prefer local television to
none.
Yet Justice Breyer does not believe it violates the First
Amendment for the government to choose between these classes
of viewers. 8' In his view, it was not unreasonable for Congress to
conclude that the viewing choices of the local over-the-air broadcast viewer were more restricted than those of the typical cable
subscriber.82 When balancing the speech suppressive aspects of
must-carry as it affects cable subscribers against the access interests of over-the-air viewers, Justice Breyer rules for the
latter.' The cable subscriber has an ever-increasing range of
programming choices while the over-the-air viewer programming choices are more restricted and will likely continue to
decrease as the over-the-air market contracts.'
Thus, the three potential consequences of cable television's
besting of over-the-air broadcasting identified in this Article
weigh heavily under Justice Breyer's novel balancing approach, tipping the scale in support of must-carry.
II. THE DENVER AREA CASE
A. Justice Breyer's Analysis of Section 10(a)
of the 1992 CableAct
In Denver Area, 5 the Supreme Court reviewed the First
Amendment validity of several 1992 Cable Act provisions."

81. See Turner 11, 117 S. Ct. at 1205 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
82. Justice Breyer set forth his view of the problem in Turner I: "[Als cable
becomes more popular, it may well become still more restricted insofar as the overthe-air market shrinks and thereby, by itself, becomes less profitable. In these circumstances, I do not believe the First Amendment dictates a result that favors the
cable viewers' interests." Id. at 1205 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
83. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
84. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
85.
518 U.S. 727 (1996).
The Denver Area Court addressed a controversy that arose from regulatory
86.
access requirements enacted by Congress in the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984 (1984 Cable Act), Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.), and in the 1992 Cable Act, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat.
1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). As a general matter,
cable operators determine what types of programming they are going to deliver to
their subscribers over their available channels. See Denver Area, 118 U.S. at 737. Cable operator editorial discretion is limited, however, by two types of regulatory access
requirements that resulted from political initiatives seeking to promote outside access
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One of the provisions, section 10(a), authorized a cable operator to refuse to carry leased access programming deemed
indecent. 7 The D.C. Circuit held that the First Amendment
did not apply to section 10(a) because the censorial power was
in the hands of private individuals, the cable operators, rather
than the government." In a plurality opinion for the Supreme
Court, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
and Souter, rejected the D.C. Circuit's rationale, utilized a new
contextual balancing analysis, and held that section 10(a) did
not violate the First Amendment. 9
The cable programmer petitioners contended otherwise,'
and Justice Breyer summarized their argument as follows:
"[C] able system operators have considerably more power to
'censor' program viewing than do broadcasters, for individual

to the cable medium. See id. at 788, 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The first type of access regulations require cable operators to set aside channels for
"public, educational, or governmental" (PEG) programming. See id. at 734. In 1984, in
order to further the "substantial governmental and First Amendment interest in promoting a diversity of views provided through multiple technology media," 1992 Cable
Act, § 2(a)(7), 106 Stat. at 1461, Congress explicitly authorized local franchise authorities to require cable operators to set aside PEG channels. See 47 U.S.C. § 531(b)
(1994). Further, Congress expressly denied the cable operator any editorial control
over PEG channels, except for the broadcast of obscene material. See id. § 531(e).
The other type of access regulation-leased access channels, see id. § 532(b)()provides channels that a "cable operator must set aside for unaffiliated programmers
who pay to transmit shows of their own." Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 794-95 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Congress also denied cable operators
editorial control over leased access channels. See 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(2) (1994).
87. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 10(a),
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (1994)). Section 10(a) permitted cable operators to ban
leased access programming that "describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or
organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by contemporary community
standards." 47 U.S.C. § 532(h).
88. See Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(stating that the 1992 Cable Act "adjusted editorial authority between two private
groups" and, therefore, did not constitute state action implicating the First Amendment).
89.
See DenverArea, 518 U.S. at 732-33, 743-44, 768.
Cable operators own a network, typically composed of coaxial cable, that is
90.
used to convey television programming over a number of cable channels into subscribers' homes. See id. at 733. Programming is obtained from a variety of sources. "Most
channels carry programming produced by independent firms, including 'many national and regional cable programming networks that have emerged in recent years,'
as well as some programming that the system operator itself (or an operator affiliate)
may provide." Id. at 733-34 (quoting Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 629). Because of the mustcarry rules that were upheld in Turner II, several of a cable operators' channels will
receive broadcasting from local over-the-air broadcasters. Without the must-carry
rules, cable operators could select to show only programming that they purchase from
cable programmers, most of which are partly owned by cable operators.
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communities typically have only one cable system."9 ' The cable
operator thus controls a bottleneck. This control was the reason that "originally led government-local and federal-to
insist that operators provide leased and public access channels
free of operator editorial control."'
Two additional arguments were lodged against authorizing
cable operators to censor cable programming on leased access
channels. First, cable operators are unusually dependent on
government at the most basic level; they need government
permission to string cable on streets and public rights of way.93
Second, it is easy to argue that cable operators are not in journalism at all. Indeed, they resemble telephone companies more
than newspapers or broadcasters.9 Telephone companies are
common carriers that must make lines available to all customers, despite the content of transmissions.9 5 Cable systems
operators, in turn, contract with cable programmers for the
use of the cable operators' many channels.9 6
Justice Breyer was unwilling to apply existing First
Amendment doctrine to the novel problems presented by new
media technologies in Denver Area, expressly rejecting
analogizing cable television to a public forum, a common carrier, or a media owner with traditional property rights. 97 By
contrast, Justices Kennedy and Thomas applied existing
First Amendment categorical standards to these situations.9"
Justice Kennedy viewed access channels as common carriers.9 9 He believed that cablecast is a medium protected by the
First Amendment, so strict scrutiny should apply and deem
section 10(a) invalid."' Justice Thomas thought First
Amendment rights rest with the property owner-the cable

91.
DenverArea, 518 U.S. at 738.
92.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 30-31 (1984)).
93.
See id. at 739.
94.
See id.
95.
See id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96.
See id. at 787-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97.
See id. at 740.
98.
See id. at 739-40 ("Justices Kennedy and Thomas would have us decide this
case simply by transferring and applying literally categorical standards this Court has
developed in other contexts.").
99.
See id. at 796-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Laws requiring cable operators to provide leased access are the practical equivalent
of making them common carriers, analogous in this respect to telephone companies:
They are obliged to provide a conduit for the speech of others.").
100. See id. at 805-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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system operator. 10 ' As A.J. Liebling, the acerbic journalist and
journalism critic, used to
say: freedom of the press belongs to
10 2
the man who owns one.
Breyer criticized both the Kennedy and the Thomas approaches:
Both categorical approaches suffer from the same flaws;
they import law developed in very different contexts into
a new and changing environment, and they lack the flexibility necessary to allow government to respond to very
serious practical problems without sacrificing the free exchange of ideas the First Amendment is designed to
protect.103
Breyer rejected the straight-jacket of the three-tiered standards of review, imported from Equal Protection law, which have
captured First Amendment doctrine in recent years.1' Instead,
he interpreted the path of First Amendment law from Schenck
v. United States01 5 to Abrams v. United States'° to Texas v. Johns as manifesting
son"
to FCCand
v. Pacifica
(Pacifica)"
an enduring
guidingFoundation
principle: "Congress
may
not regulate

101. See id. at 817, 821-24 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Thomas stated:
Because the access provisions are part of a scheme that restricts the free
speech rights of cable operators, and expands the speaking opportunities of access programmers, who have no underlying constitutional right to speak
through the cable medium, I do not believe that access programmers can challenge the scheme, or a particular part of it, as an abridgment of their "freedom
of speech."
Id. at 823 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Thomas focuses on the First Amendment interests of cable operators, the
entity that owns the medium. Justice Thomas would not accord First Amendment
significance to the interests of viewers or programmers. See discussion infra Part
III.D.
102. A.J. Liebling, The Wayward Press: Do You Belong in Journalism?, NEW
YORKER, May 14, 1960, at 105.
103. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 740.
104. See id. at 784 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (limiting the First Amendment right of a speaker
whose words cause a "clear and present danger").
106. 250 U.S. 616, 619 (1919) (following Schenck).
107. 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (holding a flag-burning prohibition did not prevent
the incitement of violence, thereby violating the First Amendment).
108. 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (finding obscene speech outside First Amendment
protection).
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speech except in cases of extraordinary need and with the exercise of a degree of care that we have not elsewhere required." °9
This principle, with its phrases "extraordinary need" and
"degree of care," seems to be a difficult standard to satisfy.
Indeed, it resembles the strict scrutiny standard of review.
The principle's demanding phraseology notwithstanding, Justice Breyer opts not to apply this standard very strictly."
The First Amendment principle that Justice Breyer announces allows for exceptions and exemptions."' Indeed, he
relies on the First Amendment exceptions that the Supreme
Court has carved out in the past."' These are discrete areas
where the full protection of First Amendment law has been
held not to apply-fighting words," libel,"' commercial
speech,"5 and indecent speech."'
Brushing past the obfuscating complexities of the SullivanGertz doctrine "7 and the four-part
Central Hudson
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
"certain

Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 740.
See id. at 743.
See infra text accompanying notes 113-120.
See id. at 740-41.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (noting that
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech" such as fighting words
can be punished without raising "any Constitutional problem"). In Chaplinsky, the
Court upheld a conviction where the defendant was arrested for calling a town marshal a "God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist." Id. at 569.
R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), has greatly altered the traditional
view of fighting words as a completely unprotected category. Under R.AV, viewpoint
discrimination by government even within the context of fighting words would be
impermissible. See id. at 381.
114. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) ("Calculated falsehood falls
into that class of utterances which 'are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'"
(quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572)).
115. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) ("Nevertheless, our decisions have recognized 'the
"commonsense" distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which
occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties
of speech.' The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression." (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)) (citations omitted)).
116. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744-48 (regulating indecent speech
on the radio).
117. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974) (holding that in a
libel suit a private figure plaintiff would not be required to show "actual malice" as
was required for public officials and figures); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 283 (1964) (requiring public officials and figures to prove "actual malice" in order
to establish a claim of libel). The Court's distinction among public officials, public figures (general and limited/vortex), and private figures has created an intricate and
confusing libel jurisprudence. See BARRON & DIENES, supra note 12, at 117-32.
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test,118 Breyer argued that the Court has used a balancing test
sensitive to a specific context or field, and this "guiding principle" of First Amendment case law calls for practical
application rather than absolutism."' Specifically, Justice
Breyer asserted that this guiding principle is constantly being
adapted to the "balance of competing interests and the special
circumstances of each field of application."20
At first glance, Justice Breyer's balancing test seems to be
12
no better than the discredited balancing test of the Dennis
era, but it is actually a new and better balancing test. As used
by Justice Breyer in Denver Area, the new approach weighs
the strength of the government interest in the suppression of
expression against the strength of the government interest in
access for expression. 12 In addition, Justice Breyer declined to
choose a specific standard that would predetermine such issues; for example, his balancing approach left open the
question of "whether the interests of the owners of communications media always subordinate the interests of all other
users of a medium."2 2 Thus, the access for expression dimension of the new balancing test is what makes it new and
better.
Contemporary First Amendment doctrine played a much
stronger role for Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas in Denver
118. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The four-part analysis developed in Central Hudson for commercial speech cases requires that:
[Courts must] determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.
Id.
119. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 740-41.
120. Id.
121. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (adopting Judge Learned Hand's formulation of a
balancing test for the clear and present danger doctrine, in which the court must determine "whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger").
122. See DenverArea, 518 U.S. at 743.
123. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 742-43. Justice Thomas candidly contends, as Justice Breyer notes, that the First Amendment protects the owners of the media and no
one else: "Like a free-lance writer seeking a paper in which to publish newspaper
editorials, a programmer is protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has no free-standing First Amendment right to have that programming
transmitted." Id. at 817.
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Area than Justice Breyer,'24 but Justice Breyer's approach outside of existing doctrine should be praised rather than
criticized. Justice Breyer made a wise choice when he declined
to pick and choose among various current First Amendment
doctrinal alternatives and to identify one of them as the doctrine which should forever govern cable regulation.'25
In Justice Breyer's view, the provision at issue, section 10(a),
effectively balanced the relevant competing interests. 126 These
interests included protecting children from exposure to indecency, 12 reconciling the interests of leased access channel
programmers with the editing rights of cable operators," and

124. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's Denver Area opinion, see discussion infra Part III.C. For a discussion of Justice Thomas' Denver Area dissent, see discussion
infra Part III.D.
125.
Justice Breyer explains his reluctance to select a definitive First Amendment standard or analogy to evaluate cable regulation as follows:
Justices Kennedy and Thomas would have us further declare which, among the
many applications of the general approach that this Court has developed over
the years, we are applying here. But no definitive choice among competing
analogies (broadcast, common carrier, bookstore) allows us to declare a single
rigid standard, good for now and for all future media and purposes.... [Aiware
as we are of the changes taking place in the law, the technology, and the industrial structure, related to telecommunications, we believe it unwise and
unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of words now.
DenverArea, 518 U.S. at 741-42.
126. See id. at 743.
127. See id. ("T]he provision before us comes accompanied with an extremely important justification, one that this Court has often found compelling-the need to
protect children from exposure to patently offensive sex-related material." (citations
omitted)).
128. See id. at 743-44. The utility of Justice Breyer's balancing approach is that it
focuses on the First Amendment interests of all the various players in the communications process.
The balancing approach Justice Breyer develops in Denver Area has a First
Amendment context for its focus. It is instructive to note, as Professor Fallon has
pointed out, that the Supreme Court often turns to balancing in constitutional law
when it wishes to undertake a multi-factored analysis:
Supreme Court judgments about which kind of [doctrinal] test to apply frequently depend on the sort of multipart assessment that the metaphor of
"balancing" reflects. Such an assessment becomes necessary whenever, after the
identification of a constitutional norm or value, a further question remains
about how that norm or value is best implemented in light of contingent empirical conditions, institutional competencies and pathologies, and predictive
judgments about the effects of alternative tests.
Fallon, supra note 26, at 77.
Even more directly descriptive of Justice Breyer's approach is Professor Fallon's
suggestion that balancing be viewed as a "metaphor for multifactor decisionmaking."
Id. at 80.
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the swirl of competing interests similar to those presented in
Pacifica."9 After considering these interests, Justice Breyer
concluded:
The importance of the interest at stake here-protecting
children from exposure to patently offensive depictions of
sex; the accommodation of the interests of programmers
in maintaining access channels and of cable operators in
editing the contents of their channels; the similarity of
the problem and its solution to those at issue in Pacifica;
and the flexibility inherent in an approach that permits
private cable operators to make editorial decisions, lead
us to conclude that § 10(a) is a sufficiently tailored response to an extraordinarily important problem. 3 '
Furthermore, Justice Breyer found that the resolution of
these competing interests by section 10(a) was both reasonable
and flexible.' 1 The provision permitted censorship by cable operators but did not require it."'
Nevertheless, Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy raised
some perplexing First Amendment questions. Can private
property be characterized as a public forum? 33 Do public access channels constitute a public forum?" Can cable operators
be considered common carriers when they allow leased access
programming? 5 Should the claims of users of a medium always, as Justice Thomas insisted, be subordinated
to the
6
wishes of owners of communications media?"1
Instead of addressing any of these questions, Justice Breyer
stated that they did not need to be answered" 7 and opted to
answer only the specific questions raised by section 10(a) under the guiding principle he identified at the beginning of his
opinion." 8 Justice Breyer held that cable operators could bar
indecent programming from leased access channels consistent
with the First Amendment because such a holding dealt with
129. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 744.
130. Id. at 743 (citation omitted).
131. See id. at 746.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 791-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. See id. at 791-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. See id. at 794-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. See id. at 816-17 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
137. See id. at 743.
138. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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the serious problem of indecency "without imposing, in light of
the relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restriction on
speech.""9 I believe Justice Breyer upheld section 10(a) both
because of its access features and because of its minimal censorship features.4 ° Justice Breyer stressed, however, the access
dimension of section 10(a) in his decision, making it a critical
factor in his balancing analysis.' Thus, the emphasis placed
on access by the new balancing approach is a dominant feature
that distinguishes it from the old balancing test.
B. Justice Breyer: Skepticism, Context,
and FirstAmendment Doctrine
As discussed above, Justice Breyer's survey of the path of
First Amendment law emphasizes its flexibility and its
adaptability."" According to Justice Breyer, First Amendment
commitment to protect speech from government regulation
through "close judicial scrutiny" has been accomplished "without
imposing judicial formulae so rigid that they become a
straightjacket that disables Government from responding to
serious problems.""" These comments, however, seem a more
accurate statement of the objective he seeks rather than a
139. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 743.
140. See id. at 745-47. Justice Breyer says in this regard:
[Tihe permissive nature of the provision, coupled with its viewpoint-neutral application, is a constitutionally permissible way to protect children from the type
of sexual material that concerned Congress, while accommodating both the
First Amendment interests served by the access requirements and those served
in restoring to cable operators a degree of the editorial control that Congress
removed in 1984.
Id. at 747.
141. See id. at 744-45. Justice Breyer specifically identifies the access for expression dimension of section 10(a):
The First Amendment interests involved are therefore complex, and involve a
balance between those interests served by the access interests themselves
(increasing the availability of avenues of expression to programmers who oth-

erwise would not have them) and the disadvantage to the First Amendment
interests of cable operators and other programmers (those to whom the cable

operator would have assigned the channels devoted to access).
Id. at 743-44.
142. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
143. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 741.
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description of the current state of First Amendment law. In
fact, the construction of the new balancing doctrine suggests
that contemporary First Amendment law has become a
doctrinal prison which often disables government from dealing
with difficult and serious problems.'" Indeed, the whole thrust
of Justice Breyer's opinion in Denver Area represents a flight
from the consequences of 14mechanical application of existing
First Amendment doctrine. 5

Mechanical application of traditional First Amendment
doctrine in the cable context would have resulted seemingly
in a system of cable operators subjected to the same standard
as broadcasters. In Pacifica, the Supreme Court upheld a
sanction for broadcasting indecent programming during the
mid-afternoon hours when the audience was largely comprised of children. 146 In the past, courts distinguished cable

from broadcasting on the ground that broadcasting was more
pervasive and easier for children to access, and the governjustified in imposing greater regulations
ment was thereby
47
on broadcasting.

144. See supra text accompanying notes 126-32.
145. See infra text accompanying notes 154-59.
146. See Pacifica,438 U.S. at 750.
147. See Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420-21 (11th Cir. 1985). In Cruz, the Eleventh Circuit considered the First Amendment validity of a Miami ordinance
regulating the distribution of obscene and indecent material on cable television. See
id. at 1416-17. The Eleventh Circuit rejected Pacifica as inapplicable. See id. at 1420
("[W]e are persuaded that Pacifica cannot be extended to cover the particular facts of
this case."). The Court of Appeals found that cable was simply less intrusive and less
pervasive than broadcasting. See id. at 1420-21.
In Cruz, the Eleventh Circuit explained the rationale for its distinction between
broadcasting and cable:
The Court's concern with the pervasiveness of the broadcast media can best be
seen in its description of broadcasted material as an "intruder" into the privacy
of the home. Cablevision, however, does not "intrude" into the home. The Cablevision subscriber must affirmatively elect to have cable service come into his
home. Additionally, the subscriber must make the additional affirmative decision whether to purchase any "extra" programming services, such as HBO....
The Supreme Court's reference to a "nuisance rationale" is not applicable to the
Cablevision system, where there is no possibility that a non-cable subscriber
will be confronted with materials carried only on cable. One of the keys to the
very existence of cable television is the fact that cable programming is available
only to those who have the cable attached to their television sets.
Id. at 1420 (quoting Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748-50) (citations and footnote omitted).

SUMNER 1998]

The Electronic Media

845

Justice Breyer, on the other hand, seemed to accept cable as
an intruder in the home. 148 He did not inquire into the pervasiveness of cable from the point of view of the cable subscriber,
as the Eleventh Circuit did in Cruz. Instead, he directed his
inquiry from the vantage point of a child whose parent subscribed to cable. From such a perspective, Justice Breyer found
Pacifica directly applicable. Citing cable viewing studies, Justice Breyer concluded: "All [the Pacifica] factors are present
here. Cable television broadcasting, including access channel
broadcasting, is as 'accessible to children' as over-the-air
broadcasting, if not more so. Cable television systems, including access channels, 'have established a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Americans."" 49 He noted that studies showed that "cable subscribers needed to sample more
channels before settling on a program, thereby making them
more, not less, susceptible to random exposure to unwanted
materials."150 In fact, Justice Breyer observed that section 10(a)
was less restrictive than the sanction in Pacifica because it
"likely restricts speech less than, not more than, the ban at
issue in Pacifica."5'
Did Justice Breyer use strict scrutiny in evaluating section
10(a)? On one level, his opinion incorporates the formalism of
compliance with the restrictive strict scrutiny standard, but it
is clear that Justice Breyer's approach is medium-specific, factspecific, and nondoctrinal. For example, even though Justice
Breyer "agreed" with Justice Kennedy that section 10(a) must
be scrutinized "with the greatest care, "152 and that the interest
of protecting children served by section 10(a) is compelling,'5 3
Breyer departed from Kennedy's strict scrutiny analysis in two
respects. First, Breyer noted that "Justice Kennedy's focus on
categorical analysis forces him to disregard the cable system
operators' interests."'" Thus, Justice Breyer advanced the notion that the free speech interests of the cable operator should
be considered in cases where an access requirement was imposed on the operator. Yet this did not mean, as Justice Breyer
described Justice Thomas' contention, that "everything turns
148. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 745 ("'Patently offensive' material from [cable]
stations can 'confron[t] the citizen' in the 'privacy of the home' with little or no prior
warning." (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748) (citations omitted)).
149. Id. at 744-45 (quoting Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748) (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 745.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 787.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 745.
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on the rights of the cable owner."155 Rather, to Justice Breyer, it
meant that "the expressive
interests of cable operators do play
156
a legitimate role."
Second, while Justice Kennedy thought the case required a
very strict and narrow tailoring test by analogy to the public
forum cases,'57 Justice Breyer opted not to invoke the public
forum doctrine. Again, Justice Breyer found pragmatic considerations trumped doctrinal ones: "Rather than seeking an
analogy to a category of cases, however, we have looked to the
cases themselves."' Using that criterion, he asserted that
"Pacifica provides the closest analogy and lends considerable
support to our conclusion."'59
Justice Breyer's approach to First Amendment problems is
clearly skeptical, and his approach is contextual both in general and within a specific medium. Thus, a key difference
between Cruz and Denver Area may well be their timing.
Cruz, a 1985 decision, was decided eleven years before Denver Area, and the number of American households wired to
cable dramatically increased in the years between the decisions. 6 ' The petitioners in Denver Area believed Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,6 ' a case in which

the Supreme Court struck down a total ban on indecent phone
"'
calls (so called "dial-a-porn), 62
constituted precedent for
16
striking down Section 10(a). ' Yet Justice Breyer did not perceive Sable as relevant because he believed children were less
likely to be exposed to indecent material over the telephone

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 791-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. Id. at 747.
159. Id. at 747-48.
160. See National Cable Television Ass'n, Cable Television Developments: Basic
Cable 1977-1997 (visited Sept. 4, 1998) <http://www.ncta.com/dir_basic.html> (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Roughly forty million
households, totaling 46.2% of television households, subscribed to basic cable in 1985.
See id. Almost sixty-six million households, 67.3% of television households, were basic
cable subscribers in 1997. See id. These numbers have remained stable through early
1998. See National Cable Television Ass'n, Cable Television Developments: Current
Estimates (visited Sept. 4, 1998) <http'/www.ncta.comldircurrent.html> (on file with
the University ofMichigan Journalof Law Reform).
161. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
162. See id. at 131.
163. See DenverArea, 518 U.S. at 748.
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than through cable.' Simply put, the telephone was less intrusive than cable."
Justic Breyer seemed to fly in the face of the new world of
assured First Amendment protection for cable operators ushered in by Turner I. Justice Breyer's response to this
contention was shrewdly crafted. He acknowledged the Turner
I declaration that cable should be accorded greater First
Amendment protection than broadcasting because the scarcity
rationale justifying broadcast regulation did not apply to cable, 166 but he responded that despite the meaningful elements
of this distinction for the "structural regulations at issue there
(the must-carry rules)," it had "little to do with a case that involves the effects of television viewing on children."16 7 Even if
must-carry is viewed as content-neutral, however, Turner I
seems arguably relevant to Denver Area, because it held content-based regulation of cable to a strict scrutiny standard.
Justice Breyer is not alone in his skepticism about the wisdom of applying contemporary First Amendment doctrine to
new and difficult problems. 8 Despite the steady and luxuriant
growth of First Amendment doctrine, its place is hardly secure
in the hearts of the present members of the Court. For example, Justice Kennedy, while calling for adherence to established
doctrine in Denver Area, struck out against contemporary
standards of review in Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of
6
New York State Crime Victims Board. 1

164. See id. Justice Breyer noted:
The ban at issue in Sable, however, was not only a total governmentally imposed ban on a category of communications, but also involved a communications
medium, telephone service, that was significantly less likely to expose children
to the banned material, was less intrusive, and allowed for significantly more
control over what comes into the home than either broadcasting or the cable
transmission system before us.

Id.
165. See id.
166. See id. ("The Court's distinction in Turner, furthermore, between cable and
broadcast television, relied on the inapplicability of the spectrum scarcity problem to
cable.").

167, Id.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 169-72.
169. 502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (questioning the appropriateness of the strict scrutiny standard and stating that strict scrutiny "has no real or
legitimate place when the Court considers ...whether the State may enact a burdensome restriction of speech based on content only").
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The Denver Area petitioners argued that leased access
channels on cable television were public forums. 171 Therefore,
under existing First Amendment doctrine, content-based
regulation of such fora violated the First Amendment unless
such regulation was shown both to serve a compelling interest
and narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.171 Justice Kennedy contended that leased access channels were common
carriers and that a strict scrutiny standard of review should be
applied to content-based regulation of leased access channels.7 7 Thus, under either of these kindred contentions, the
Supreme Court could have struck down section 10(a) on First
Amendment grounds.
Justice Breyer counseled against the easy application of a
public forum or common carrier analysis to discrete and difficult cable television issues: "[We are wary of the notion that a
partial analogy in one context, for which we have developed
doctrines, can compel a full range of decisions in such a new
and changing area."73 In addition, Justice Breyer was skeptical about whether existing First Amendment doctrine provided
clear answers to the difficult problems raised by the 1992 Cable Act. 74 He differed from some of his colleagues in this
respect.175 In short, Justice Breyer's skepticism encompassed
both the application of old doctrine to new problems and the
old doctrine itself. For example, is it clear that the leased access channel is a public forum?176 Even if it is a limited public
forum dedicated to one type of content alone, it is not clear

170. See DenverArea, 518 US. at 749.
171. See id. (noting that the petitioners argued that "the Government cannot
'enforce a content-based exclusion' from a public forum unless 'necessary to serve a
compelling state interest' and 'narrowly drawn'" (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983))).
172. See id. at 795-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173. Id. at 749.
174. See id. at 741-42 ("[N]o definitive choice among competing analogies
(broadcast, common carrier, bookstore) allows us to declare a rigid single standard,
good for now and for all future media and purposes.").
175. See discussion infra Part III.C-D.
176. For a discussion of the public forum doctrine, see supra note 12. Justice
Breyer rejects Justice Kennedy's application of the public forum doctrine to public
access channels because: 1) he questions whether the public forum doctrine "should be
imported wholesale into the area of common carriage regulation"; 2) the Court has not
yet addressed whether a limited public forum that the government dedicates to "one
type of content or another is necessarily subject to the highest level of scrutiny"; and
3) the public forum doctrine does not resolve the conflict in "interests of programmers,
viewers, cable operators, and children." Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 749-50.
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that such a forum must be evaluated under a strict scrutiny
standard of review.'77
For Justice Breyer, the First Amendment validity of the
Congressional decision to authorize cable operators to ban
indecent programming on leased access channels must be considered in light of the "otherwise totally open nature of the
forum that leased access channels provide for communication
of other than patently offensive sexual material-taking account of the fact that the limitation was imposed in light of
experience gained from maintaining a totally open 'forum.' 18
In other words, upon weighing the speech-suppressive aspects
of section 10(a) against its access dimension-a speechcreating dimension-the First Amendment is better served
by upholding the provision than by invalidating it. Thus, the
access dimension of section 10(a) is crucial, and it is more important than the use of a common carrier analysis, a public
forum analysis, or a content-based analysis. 7 9
C. Section 1O(b) of the 1992 Cable Act
Section 10(b) of the 1992 Cable Act presented a different set
of interests for Justice Breyer to consider, but he maintained
his commitment to analyzing the relevant interests
and bal8
ancing them in favor of the interest in jeopardy.
Section 10(b) of the 1992 Cable Act required the cable operator to segregate and block "patently offensive" sexually
oriented materials that appear on leased channels. 8' No such
obligation is imposed on cable operators vis-&-vis other channels on its system. Under section 10(b), subscribers were
forced to request indecent programming in writing if they
wanted it, indecent programming needed to be cablecast on a
separate channel, and cable operators were forced to reblock
177. See id. at 750 ("Our cases have not yet determined, however, that government's decision to dedicate a public forum to one type of content or another is
necessarily subject to the highest level of scrutiny.").
178. Id.
179. See id. ("If we consider this particular limitation of indecent television programming acceptable as a constraint on speech, we must no less accept the limitation
it places on access to the claimed public forum or on use of a common carrier.").
180. See infra text accompanying notes 184-93.
181. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
§ 10(b) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 532(j) (1994)); see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.701(c)
(1995) (limiting access to subscribers who request it in writing).
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the indecent programming if subscribers changed their minds
regarding access.182 In sum, the provisions put special burdens
leased access programmers, and cable operaon subscribers,
18 3
tors.
In his plurality opinion, Justice Breyer held that section
10(b) violated the First Amendment.'" In keeping with the
rest of his Denver Area opinion, Justice Breyer declined to hold
that strict scrutiny or the Pacifica standard applied categorically to the regulation of indecent programming on cable."18
Note, however, that while Justice Breyer minimized the significance or usefulness of the existing formulations of First
Amendment law in resolving the First Amendment challenges
in Denver Area, section 10(b) fails whether examined under
strict scrutiny, Sable, heightened scrutiny, Thrner I, O'Brien, or
Central Hudson. Breyer states: "The provision before us does
not reveal the caution and care that the standards underlying
these various verbal formulas impose upon laws that seek to
reconcile the critically important interest in protecting free
speech with very important, or even compelling, interests that
sometimes warrant restrictions."8 6
This statement both avoids and rewrites doctrine, as the
"care and caution" formulation is really only a surface gloss on
Justice Breyer's balancing analysis. The key question in this
analysis is: When free speech interests are balanced against
important or compelling governmental interests, does the particular governmental restraint under review reflect the
182. See 47 U.S.C. § 532(j). Section 532(0) provides:
[Tihe Commission shall promulgate regulations designed to limit the access of
children to indecent programming... by-(A) requiring cable operators to place
on a single channel all indecent programs, as identified by program providers,
intended for carriage on channels designated for commercial use under this section; (B) requiring cable operators to block such single channel unless the
subscriber requests access to such channel in writing; and (C) requiring programmers to inform cable operators if the program would be indecent as
defined by Commission regulations.

Id.
183. See id.
184. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 760 ("Consequently, we cannot find that the
'segregate and block' restrictions on speech are a narrowly, or reasonably, tailored
effort to protect children.").
185. See id. at 755. This was despite the fact that Justice Breyer had relied on
Pacifica to justify the validity of the regulation of leased access channels set forth in
section 10(a): "Nor need we here determine whether, or the extent to which Pacifica
does, or does not, impose some lesser standard of review where indecent speech is at
issue." Id. (citations omitted).
186. Id. at 756.
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' If the answer is yes, it is unnecnecessary caution and care? 87
essary to undertake the obscuring project of traveling through
the requisite doctrinal steps.
Breyer concluded that the government simply failed to
provide an adequate justification for section 10(b). 1m Note
also that section 10(b) had no redeeming access dimension.
Indeed, the government failed to answer fundamental questions about the restrictions on access imposed by section
10(b). 8 9 Specifically, why were the rigorous steps taken to protect children from patently offensive material on leased
channels not applied to the unleased channels?"9° After all, a
much greater number of children watch the unleased channels.
In addition, why is blocking sufficient protection for children
against regular sex-dedicated channels?..' And why must written access requests be added to blocking as a restriction when
sex-dedicated channels are leased?.9 . There was no access for
expression dimension to section 10(b) to balance against its
speech suppressive aspects. Therefore, employing neither the
strict scrutiny standard nor the less deferential standard used
by Justice Stevens in Pacifica, Justice Breyer struck down section 10(b). 93
There are, of course, limitations to Justice Breyer's balancing analysis. Denver Area does not direct a specific standard of
review for regulation of sexually oriented material on cable.
Instead, Justice Breyer again concludes that the statute fails
under any of our First Amendment doctrines: "ITihe 'segregate
and block' restrictions on speech are [not] a narrowly, or reasonably, tailored effort to protect children. Rather, they are
overly restrictive, 'sacrific[ingl' important First Amendment
interests for too 'speculative a gain.'"'

187. Whether Justice Breyer's "caution and care" formulation is more speech protective than the narrowly-tailored requirement of the strict scrutiny standard is
unclear.
188. See Denver Area, 518 US. at 757 (questioning why the government failed to
investigate alternative methods of blocking as opposed to imposing a complete ban).
189. See id. (noting that "[tihe record does not answer" why alternative methods
enacted in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56,
could not achieve the government's asserted interest, or why the regulations only
applied to leased channels).
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 757-58 (discussing the lack of a suitable justification for the government's imposition of segregate and block requirements on cable operators).
194. Id. at 760 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 127 (1973)).
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D. Section 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Act
Justice Breyer struck down section 10(c),195 the last of the
1992 Cable Act provisions challenged on First Amendment
grounds in Denver Area, despite its similarity to section
10(a). 196 Section 10(c) authorized cable operators to prevent the
transmission of patently offensive programming on public access channels.'97 Section 10(c), like section 10(a), had a clear
access dimension. It is through public access channels that local communities provide access for the views and ideas of the
public on the cable systems they franchise.9 "
Justice Breyer distinguished section 10(c) from section 10(a)
on four grounds. 99 First, unlike leased access channels under
section 10(a), section 10(c) regulated public access channels
over which the cable operators had no editorial control.2°°
Leased access channels, on the other hand, were in the operator's control until leased.20' As Justice Breyer put it: "Unlike
[section] 10(a) therefore, [section] 10(c) does not restore to cable operators editorial rights that they once had, and the
countervailing First Amendment interest is nonexistent, or at
least much diminished." 2 In short, Justice Breyer perceived
cable operators as having no First Amendment interests in
public access channels.
195. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 10(c),
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 531 note (1994)), as amended by Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 136 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 531(e) (West Supp. 1997)); see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.702 (1995) (allowing cable operators to restrict PEG channel access for obscene or indecent materials).
196. See Denver Area, 518 US. at 766.
197. Section 10(c) originally appeared as a note to 47 U.S.C. § 531 and was later
amended and codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 531(e) by the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
The original note to section 531 instructed the FCC to promulgate such regulations as
may be necessary to enable a cable operator of a cable system to prohibit the use, on
such system, of any channel capacity of any public, educational, or governmental access facility for any programming which contains obscene material, sexually explicit
conduct, or material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct. See 47 U.S.C. § 531
note. The amended version of this statutory requirement prohibits a cable operator
from exercising any editorial control over PEG channels, "except a cable operator may
refuse to transmit any public access program or portion of a public access program
which contains obscenity, indecency, or nudity." 47 U.S.C.A. § 531(e).
198. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 760-61.
199. See id. at 761.
200. See id.
201. See id. ("Significantly, these are channels over which cable operators have
not historically exercised editorial control.").
202. Id.
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Second, public access channels were managed by structures
blending public and private supervision."' Whereas access
channels were the domain of the lessee once leased, accountability was built into the management systems of public
access channels.2cs Thus, the local franchising authority could
regulate public access channels to ensure that indecent programming is not aired." 5
Third, by their very nature, public access channels were cre06
ated to meet the programming needs of local communities.
Protecting children against patently offensive programming
may be a service objective of public access channel programming,2°7 but protection of public access drove Justice Breyer's
conclusion here.
Fourth, the legislative history and record indicated that
sexually explicit programming is found with greater ease on
leased channels than on public access channels.2 8
In sum, an analysis of Denver Area from an access perspective reveals that section 10(a) was upheld to protect the
governmental interest in access for expression, section 10(b)
was struck down as a suppression of access with no countervailing governmental interest in limiting access, and section
10(c) was struck down because it clearly trespassed on the
public access channels created by local government.2 " Thus,
under Justice Breyer's balancing analysis, a regulation will
prevail when a governmental access for expression interest
outweighs the governmental interest in suppression of expression. A regulation will fail, on the other hand, when no access
interest is involved and the governmental interest is clearly
suppression of speech alone.
203. See id.
204. See id. ("When a 'leased channel' is made available by the operator to a private lessee, the lessee has total control of programming during the leased time slot.
Public access channels, on the other hand, are normally subject to complex supervisory systems of various sorts, often with both public and private elements." (citations
omitted)).
205. See id. at 761-62.
206. See id. at 763.
207. See id. ("[T]he existence of a system aimed at encouraging and securing programming that the community considers valuable strongly suggests that a 'cable
operator's veto' is less likely necessary to achieve the statute's basic objective, protecting children, than a similar veto in the context of leased channels.").
208. See id. at 763-64 ("Finally, our examination of the legislative history and the
record before us is consistent with what common sense suggests, namely that the
public/nonprofit programming control systems now in place would normally avoid,
minimize, or eliminate any child-related problems concerning 'patently offensive' programming.").
209. See discussion supra Part II.A-D.
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III. JUSTICE BREYER'S BALANCING ANALYSISALLIES AND CRITICS

Fellow Justices and commentators have both criticized and
praised Justice Breyer's refusal to identify a First Amendment
standard for cable television.21 ° Justice Souter, acknowledging
the dynamism of the electronic media, joined Justice Breyer in
avoiding the establishment of a precise First Amendment
standard for all purposes and all media.21' Similarly, Justice
Stevens expressed apprehension about classifying access
channels into an existing category of First Amendment doctrine. 12 By contrast, Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas both
criticized Justice Breyer's departure from conventional doctrine.21 Despite his critics, Justice Breyer effectively creates a
new doctrine based on a balancing of First Amendment interests in the context of the medium and the various entities
affected.
210. One commentator has asserted that "the Supreme Court in Denver Area
should have pronounced a First Amendment standard for cable television in order to
finally remedy the inconsistencies among lower court analyses and decisions." Comment, Diana Israelashvili, A Fear of Commitment: The Supreme Court's Refusal to
Pronounce a FirstAmendment Standard for Cable Television in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 71 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 173, 181
(1997). Israelashvili complains: "As the Supreme Court awaits the 'proper' moment to
enunciate a standard of review for cable regulation, lower courts are deciding First
Amendment claims without guidance." Id. at 188. She further criticizes the Denver
Area opinion as "losing sight of First Amendment principles and instead focusing on
the mode of communication." Id. at 191. This comment, however, points out that some
of the lower courts are using a "medium dependent analysis." Id. at 190.
In a similar vein, media lawyer James Goodale has written on Denver Area:
Breyer's opinion has received uniformly bad reviews including an editorial in
the New York Times urging the Court to grant full First Amendment rights to
cable TV, a position it has resisted for years. Apparently, the Court is petrified
to take a false step in an era of technology-there is no other way to explain
[Denver Area], which arguably represents the nadir of the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence.
James C. Goodale, Outside Counsel: Caught in Breyer's Patch, 216 N.Y L.J. 1 (July 23,
1996). For Goodale, the clearly appropriate standard is strict scrutiny. See id.
The upside of a medium-dependent analysis, however, is that by focusing on the
medium of communication, courts may better understand which First Amendment
principles apply or indeed which principles best serve First Amendment objectives.
211. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 774-78 (Souter, J., concurring).
212. See id. at 768-74 (Stevens, J., concurring).
213. See id. at 780-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id.
at 812 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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A. Justice Souter-PragmaticAlly
Justice Breyer was not alone in his support for a balancing
approach in Denver Area. In a thoughtful concurrence, Justice
Souter found merit in Justice Kennedy's conviction that the
various categories of speech protection work to assure "First
Amendment security,"2 14 but he countered the validity of this
point by observing that some situations defy categorization.215
For example, the broadcast in Pacifica was protected speech,
yet the Pacifica Court supported a ban as to the particular
hour of its broadcast. 216 Thus, neither the speech nor the limitation in Denver Area can be "categorized simply by content."217
Justice Souter's analysis of the issues in DenverArea was as
medium-specific and pragmatic as Justice Breyer's analysis.
He conceded that a different standard applies to cable than to
broadcasting 2 s but that this is not invariably so. For example,
Justice Souter agreed entirely with Justice Breyer that the
easy access of children to indecency on broadcasting is equally
true of cable.219
Justice Souter offered further explanations for a return to
balancing in the case of the new electronic media beyond the
complexity of new technologies. Primary among these explanations was a concern about access for expression. Justice Souter
expressed concern in Denver Area about "the ability of individual entities to act as bottlenecks to the free flow of
information,
and, for Justice Souter, the future promises even
farther reaching innovations in new electronic technologies.22 ' In
214. Id. at 775 (Souter, J., concurring).
215. See id. (Souter, J., concurring) ("Neither the speech nor the limitation at issue here may be categorized simply by content.').
216. See id. (Souter, J., concurring) ("It is not so surprising that so contextually
complex a category [as indecency in broadcasting as discussed in Pacifica] was not
expressly assigned a standard level of scrutiny for reviewing the Government's limitation at issue there.').
217. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
218. See id. at 775-76 (Souter, J., concurring).
219. See id. at 776 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[Tioday's plurality opinion rightly observes that the characteristics of broadcast radio that rendered indecency particularly
threatening in Pacifica, that is, its intrusion into the house and accessibility to children, are also present in the case of cable television." (citation omitted)).
220. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
221. See id. at 776-77 (Souter, J., concurring) ("Because we cannot be confident
that for purposes of judging speech restrictions it will continue to make sense to distinguish cable from other technologies, and because we know that changes in these
regulated technologies will enormously alter the structure of regulation itself, we
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a sense, therefore, Justice Souter was even less enthusiastic
than Justice Breyer about the utility of categorical analysis in
resolving the First Amendment issues raised by the new electronic media: "[A]s broadcast, cable, and the cybertechnology of
the Internet and the World Wide Web approach the day of using
a common receiver, we can hardly assume that standards for
judging the regulation of one of them will not have immense,
22 Acbut now unknown and unknowable, effects on the others.""
cordingly, in charting a course which permits regulation in light
of the values in competition, we must accept the likelihood that
the media of communication will become less categorical and
more protean.
Justice Souter concluded that "a proper choice among existing doctrinal categories is not obvious."223 Justice Souter
therefore believed, like Justice Breyer, that if common sense
indicated existing doctrinal choices were unsatisfactory in resolving the problems presented, the doctrine-and not common
sense-should be scuttled.
B. The Skepticism of Justice Stevens
In classic First Amendment parlance, talk of censorship is
meaningless when wielded by a private entity such as a cable
operator. Censorship has First Amendment significance only
insofar as it is wielded by government, 2 4 as the First Amendment is addressed to government and not to the private
sector.225 This is orthodox First Amendment law. Justice Stevens' view, however, that government can create access rights
in media and limit the extent of those access rights,226 is not
orthodox First Amendment law.
As discussed previously, section 10(a) of the 1992 Cable Act
authorizes cable operators to prohibit indecent programming
should be shy about saying the final word today about what will be accepted as reasonable tomorrow.").
222. Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
223. Id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring).
224. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech.... ."). The First Amendment applies to the States by means of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 737.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 770 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("A contrary conclusion would ill-serve
First Amendment values by dissuading the Government from creating access rights
altogether." (footnote omitted)).
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transmitted over leased access channels.2 7 Section 10(a), Justice Stevens concluded, does not constitute a restraint on free
expression.2 s
Like Justices Breyer and Souter, Justice Stevens was skeptical regarding the usefulness of applying the existing
categories and doctrines of First Amendment law "to the
resolution of novel First Amendment questions arising in an
industry as dynamic as [cable] .,,229 For example, the public forum doctrine and its rigid rules did not, in Justice Stevens'
view, provide Congress with the necessary flexibility to develop
governance rules for a new industry.2 0 In addition, structural
rules designed to encourage or discourage specific programming off-limits for government also obstructed this
flexibility.231 By allowing cable operators to control indecent
programming, section 10(a) only grants cable operators the
same control over leased access channels as they have with
their regular channels regarding such programming.2 2
Justice Stevens viewed section 10(c), however, as invalid
under the First Amendment.1 3 Whereas leased access channels are creations of the federal government, public access
channels are creations of local government. Section 10(c),
which attempted to bar indecent speech, required the rejec227. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
§ 10(a), (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (1994)); discussion supra Part II.A.
228. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 769 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Section 10(a) is
therefore best understood as a limitation on the amount of speech that the Federal
Government has spared from the censorial control of the cable operator, rather than a
direct prohibition against the communication of speech that, in the absence of federal
intervention, would flow freely.").
229. Id. at 768 (Stevens, J., concurring).
230. See id. at 769 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens opines that leased access channels are similar to the must-carry rules in that leased access channels are
Congress' means for "facilitating certain speech that cable operators would not otherwise carry." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens' focus on access leads him to
conclude:
When the Federal Government opens cable channels that would otherwise be
left entirely in private hands, it deserves more deference than a rigid application of the public forum doctrine would allow. At this early stage in the
regulation of this developing industry, Congress should not be put to an all or
nothing-at-all choice in deciding whether to open certain cable channels to programmers who would otherwise lack the resources to participate in the
marketplace of ideas.
Id. (Stevens, J.,
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.

concurring).
at 769-70 (Stevens, J.,
at 769-72 (Stevens, J.,
at 772-74 (Stevens, J.,
at 772-73 (Stevens, J.,

concurring).
concurring).
concurring).
concurring).
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tion of indecent programming on public access channels and
the imposition of a federal censor into areas where such a
censorship feature would otherwise not exist.235 Justice Stevens wanted to protect local public access cable channels
from federal censorship. Thus, even though section 10(c) dealt
with suppression of speech, Justice Stevens protected access
for expression in his treatment of the provision.
Local franchising authorities might choose to create public
access channels with no restrictions on programming, save indecent programming, or they might create such channels with
no restrictions on programming at all. Yet such a decision, according to Justice Stevens, is a local, not federal, option: "The
Federal Government has no more entitlement to restrict the
power of a local authority to disseminate materials on channels of its own creation, then [sic] it has to restrict the power
of cable operators to do so on channels that they own."236
Although Justice Stevens stated in Denver Area that strict
scrutiny is appropriately applied to the regulation of even
marginally protected speech, such as indecent speech, 23 7 that
justification is not what drives his conclusion that section 10(c)
is invalid. Justice Stevens simply concluded that the harm
that section 10(c) was ostensibly designed to addressprotecting children from indecent speech-was not calibrated
with sufficient precision to justify the restraint.
In other
words, the breadth of the restraint far exceeded the need for it.
In sum, Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Denver Area
does not expressly espouse balancing, but he uses balancing
analysis, and he is indifferent to established First Amendment
doctrine if it runs counter to the realities of the communications situation.

235. See id. at 773 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("It would inject federally authorized
private censors into forums from which they might otherwise be excluded, and it
would therefore limit local forums that might otherwise be open to all constitutionally
protected speech.").
236. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
237. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
238. See id. at 774 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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C. General FirstAmendment Standards
and Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy's opinion criticized the Breyer plurality as
standardless and completely lacking in the discipline provided
by doctrine.2"9 Justice Kennedy asserted that it is particularly
crucial in cases involving emerging technology to govern First
Amendment issues by constant principles.2 0 This should be so
"even in novel settings.2 4 ' Part of Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Denver Area is a paean to the strict scrutiny standard in First
Amendment cases.242 He insisted that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate standard with which to evaluate content-based
legislation.243 This insistence seems somewhat surprising, as
Justice Kennedy insisted on a per se standard for contentbased legislation in his concurrence in Simon & Schuster,Inc.
v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board.2'

239. See id. at 780-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("The [plurality] opinion treats concepts such as public forum, broadcaster, and common carrier as mere labels rather than as categories with settled legal significance; it
applies no standard, and by this omission loses sight of existing First Amendment
doctrine.").
Justice Kennedy's criticism, however, is ironic-he lists three examples of First
Amendment doctrine that were created for specific situations, yet he criticizes the
plurality's opinion for using a balancing approach which emphasizes the specific
communications situation or context. See id. Justice Kennedy acknowledges that new
First Amendment standards were needed for broadcasters, public fora, and common
carriers. See id. at 784. Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy believes that the Court should
not do the same for cable television. See id.
240. See id. at 781 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
241. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
242. See id. at 784-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
243. See id. at 784-85 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
244. 502 U.S. 105, 124-25 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (addressing the constitutionality of a New York statute that required a criminal's revenue from publications
about her crimes to be given to the Crime Board).
In Simon & Schuster, Justice Kennedy noted that the statute was content-based
because it only applied to speech concerning a criminal's prior criminal acts. See id. at
124 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy went on to criticize the application of
strict scrutiny to content-based regulations on the ground that the standard was insufficiently speech protective:
Borrowing the compelling interest and narrow tailoring analysis [i.e., strict
scrutiny] is ill advised when all that is at issue is a content-based restriction,
for resort to the test might be read as a concession that States may censor
speech whenever they believe there is a compelling justification for doing so.
Id. at 124-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennedy's justification for the strict scrutiny standard in Denver Area, however, was that the severity of the
review required to disfavor government empowers individual
citizens to shape the government. 45 Relying on eloquent quotes
from Thrner 1246 and Cohen v. California, 7 Justice Kennedy
stated that the First Amendment is based upon the idea that
each person is allowed to decide for herself what "ideas and
beliefs" to express." This approach can prove problematic,
however, because the persons seeking to decide which ideas
and beliefs to express are often competing entities and individuals, like the cable operators, over-the-air broadcasters,
cable subscribers, and over-the-air broadcast viewers in Trner
I. Although each of these competing participants has a First
Amendment claim, their claims conflict, and strict scrutiny
doctrine does little to provide a calculus to decide which of
these competing claimants should be given precedence.
Justice Kennedy analyzed the two types of access channels
regulated by section 10(a) and section 10(c) in terms of familiar First Amendment categories.249 Whereas public access
Justice Kennedy contended that a rule of per se invalidity for content-based regulations is more appropriate. "[Simon & Schuster] present[ed] the opportunity to adhere
to a surer test for content-based cases and to avoid using an unnecessary formulation,
one with the capacity to weaken central protections of the First Amendment." Id. at
128.
245. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 782-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
246. 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
247. 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
248. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 782-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). To justify his finding that "the most exacting scrutiny" applies in
DenverArea, Justice Kennedy states:
In the realm of speech and expression, the First Amendment envisions the citizen shaping the government, not the reverse; it removes "governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of
such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect
polity." [Cohen, 403 US. at 24]. "[E]ach person should decide for him or herself
the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our
political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal." [Turner 1, 512 U.S. at
641].
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249. See id. at 791-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(summarizing regulation of PEG channels and concluding that "[plublic access channels meet the definition of a public forum"); id. at 794-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (summarizing regulation of leased access channels and
concluding that [l]aws requiring cable operators to provide leased access are the
practical equivalent of making them common carriers").
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channels are public fora, leased access channels have common
carrier obligations,"0 and both regulation of public fora and
regulations providing exceptions from common carrier obligations are subject to strict scrutiny. 1
Justice Kennedy conceded that it may be too early to
choose a single standard to govern the electronic media for
the future,2 2 but that does not mean it is unnecessary, at this
point, "to decide what standard applies to discrimination
against indecent programming on cable access channels in the
253
present state of the industry."
Whereas Justice Breyer chose to use a balancing test in
Denver Area, Justice Kennedy believed that strict scrutiny review should have been applied. Justice Kennedy defended
strict scrutiny on the ground that strict scrutiny is itself a balancing test:2 " "[SItrict scrutiny at least confines the balancing
process in a manner protective of speech; it does not disable
government from addressing serious problems, but does ensure that the solutions do not sacrifice speech to a greater
extent than necessary."255
The trouble with Justice Kennedy's defense of strict scrutiny
review is that it can serve both as an indictment and an endorsement in certain circumstances. Justice Kennedy assumed
that strict scrutiny would protect speech. While it might do so
in the context of the regulations at issue in Denver Area, strict
scrutiny cannot do so universally in cable-related speech
problems.
Somewhat paradoxically, Justice Kennedy complained that
Justice Breyer's balancing test used language very close to
that of strict scrutiny.25" He perceived the resemblance as a
250. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 678 (1992) (applying strict scrutiny to regulations of speech content in a designated public forum); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131
(1989) (applying strict scrutiny to the regulation of indecent content over a common
carrier).
252. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 784-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
253. Id. at 784 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
254. See id. at 784-85 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
255. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
256. See id. at 785-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Kennedy admonishes the plurality by declaring:
[It] cannot bring itself to apply strict scrutiny, yet realizes it cannot decide
these cases without uttering some sort of standard; so it has settled for synonyms. "[Cllose judicial scrutiny" is substituted for strict scrutiny, and "extremely
important problem" or "extraordinary proble[m]" is substituted for "compelling in-
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great source of confusion because it would force courts and
lawyers to waste time explaining the differences between
strict scrutiny and Justice Breyer's standard.25 7
Yet strong differences exist between strict scrutiny and Justice Breyer's balancing of interests test. Unlike the usual case
when strict scrutiny applies, the Denver Area plurality reached
an "unprotective outcome."25 s Identifying what qualifies as
speech-protective is itself a complex and ambiguous matter. In
Thrner I, was it speech protective to affirm the validity of the
must-carry legislation or to invalidate it? If the Court validates must-carry, the result infringes on the editorial rights of
cable operators. If the Court invalidates must-carry, the result
jeopardizes the voices of local over-the-air broadcasters and
the access interests of their audience. Despite apparent conflicts, discussion of the strict scrutiny standard as speech
protective assumes that speech rights are never in conflict.
Significantly, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in
Thrner I avoided this conflict by concluding that the must-carry
legislation is content-neutral rather than content-based.25 9 Yet
the imprecision of the content-based versus content-neutral inquiry was demonstrated by the fact that five justices
(Rehnquist, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Blackmun) supported
the notion that the must-carry rules were content-neutral,2 60
and the other four (O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg)
terest." The admonition that the restriction not be unnecessarily great in light of
the interest it serves is substituted for the usual narrow tailoring requirements.
All we know about the substitutes is that they are inferior to their antecedents.
We are told the Act must be "appropriately tailored," "sufficiently tailored," or
"carefully and appropriately addressed" to the problems at hand-anything,
evidently, except narrowly tailored.
Id. at 786 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
257. See id. at 786-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Kennedy criticizes Justice Breyer's standard, stating:
These restatements have unfortunate consequences. The first is to make principles intended to protect speech easy to manipulate. The words end up being a
legalistic cover for an ad hoc balancing of interests; in this respect the plurality

succeeds after all in avoiding the use of a standard. Second, the plurality's exercise in pushing around synonyms for the words of our usual standards will sow
confusion in the courts bound by our precedents. Those courts, and lawyers in

the communications field, now will have to discern what difference there is between the formulation the plurality applies today and our usual strict scrutiny.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
258. Id. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
259.
260.

See Turner 1, 512 US. at 643-44.
See id.
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were convinced that the rules focused on local programming and
were content-based.' Thus, the content-based versus contentneutral distinction is vulnerable to the charge Justice Kennedy
made against Justice Breyer's ad hoc balancing in Denver Area.
Namely, this slippery distinction serves as another example of
"principles intended to protect speech" 2 2 which, in application,
are subject to manipulation.
The dissenters in Thrner I,263 as well as Justice Stevens in
his Trner I concurrence, 2' advanced a powerful argument
that a major rationale of the must-carry legislation was to protect local service programming generated by local over-the-air
broadcasters. In short, the only way to keep alive the contentneutral versus content-based distinction was to subject it to
the same manipulation Justice Kennedy attributed to the balancing test used by Justice Breyer in Denver Area.
Justice Kennedy denied the government's contention in
Denver Area that Pacifica265 applied a lower standard of review.266 Instead, Justice Kennedy stated that Pacifica applied a
"context-specific analysis"26 ' to support its narrow holding.
Justice Kennedy also stated, however, that "Pacifica teaches
that access channels, even if analogous to ordinary public forums from the standpoint of the programmer, must also be
considered from the standpoint of the viewer."2 61 Strict scrutiny
was not used in Pacifica, and, not coincidentally, the Court
considered and recognized other interests beyond those of the
communicator in that case. 69
261. See id. at 676-77, 685.
262. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 786 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
263. See Thrner I, 512 U.S. at 675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
264. See id. at 669 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The public interests in protecting access to television for the millions of homes
without cable and in assuring the availability of 'a multiplicity of information sources'
are unquestionably substantial.").
265. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
266. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 803 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Pacifica did not purport, however, to apply a special standard for
indecent broadcasting.").
267. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
268. Id. at 804 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
269. Professor Charles Nesson and commentator David Marglin state that Pacifica and Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989),
"suggest that the proper approach to a First Amendment challenge to restrictions on
indecent content in a new medium is to apply strict scrutiny unless the medium is as
pervasive and accessible to children as broadcasting." Charles Nesson & David Marglin, The Day the Internet Met the First Amendment: Time and the Communications
Decency Act, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 113, 117 (1996). Nesson and Marglin, however,
recognize that the pervasiveness and accessibility characteristics are only part of an
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Justice Kennedy was convinced that the Court should have
evaluated the twin justifications for the holding in Pacificathe unique pervasiveness of broadcasting and its accessibility
to children'--under the strict scrutiny standard.271 Justice
Kennedy's opinion was an overall attack on the recognition of
indecency as a lesser protected category of expression. Citing
R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, he pointed out that "we have been
reluctant to mark off new categories of speech for diminished
constitutional protection."272 Yet it seems too late to make such
an argument, as both Pacifica and Sable recognized indecency
as a lesser protected category of speech.273
In Denver Area, Justice Kennedy perceived "no compelling
interest in restoring a cable operator's First Amendment right
of editorial discretion."274 Consequently, he advocated striking
down section 10(a). 275 Further, he asserted, carrying indecent

speech over leased access channels should not be considered
"forced speech" of the cable operator.276 Although Congress did

have a compelling interest in protecting children from indecent
speech, Justice Kennedy believed that
neither section 10(a)
2 77
nor section 10(c) was narrowly tailored.

In addition, insofar as cable operators succeed in prohibiting
indecent speech on access channels, both adults and children
are deprived of such programming. Kennedy's conclusion was
clear:
indecency analysis. See generally id. They argue that the Court is aware of how fast
technology is changing and that the law must evolve with it. See id. at 134. "This
awareness suggests that the Supreme Court will not necessarily rely on time-bound
lower court findings that the Internet should be subject to standards developed for
telephony and not for broadcast, or that it is technologically impossible to make indecent content identifiable to Internet browsers." Id.
270. See Pacifica, 438 US. at 748 (noting that indecent broadcasting "confronts
the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of intruder");
id. at 749 (noting that "broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too
young to read").
271. See Denver Area, 518 US. at 804 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
272. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing R.A.V v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-90 (1992)).
273. See Pacifica,438 U.S. at 749-50; Sable, 492 US. at 126.
274. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 805 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
275. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
276. See id. at 805-06 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
277. See id. at 806 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Congress does have, however, a compelling interest in protecting children from indecent speech .... Sections 10(a) and (c) nonetheless are not narrowly tailored to
protect children from indecent programs on access channels.").
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Sections 10(a) and (c) present a classic case of discrimination against speech based on its content. There are
legitimate reasons why the Government might wish to
regulate or even restrict the speech at issue here, but
Sections 10(a) and (c) are not drawn to address those reasons with the precision the First Amendment requires.
In the ACT cases, which the Supreme Court steadfastly declined to review,279 one side repeatedly argued that the
indecency standard enforced by the FCC was impermissibly
vague under the First Amendment and failed to meet the
strict scrutiny standard. Both arguments were continually rejected by the D.C. Circuit.280 Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg
joined Justice Kennedy in his opinion in Denver Area, although
she accepted the FCC's amorphous definition of indecency and
held that it was not vague in ACT 111.281 Further, she was
willing to rule that the FCC's safe harbor constructs could
satisfy a compelling state interest standard. 82
One of the difficulties Denver Area presents is that the examination proceeds from different focal points by various
Justices. Justice Breyer and Justice Souter analyzed the issue
by determining which standard is appropriate to govern a new
medium like cable.283 Justice Kennedy, on the other hand,
looked beyond the medium. His question related to which
standard of review is appropriate for the regulation of indecent speech.2 Kennedy's corollary to this question focused on
the Pacifica standard as a narrow holding bred in broadcasting which should not be extended to newer electronic media.2 5

278. Id. at 807 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
279. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(invalidating FCC regulations that banned public television broadcasters from airing
indecent programming) (ACT 1), overruled in part by Action for Children's Television
v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 116
S. Ct. 701 (1996); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (invalidating a Congressional ban on all indecent programming by public television broadcasters) (ACT II), cert. denied sub nom. Children's Legal Found. v. Action for
Children's Television, 503 U.S. 913 (1992); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58
F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding the banning of indecent programs between 6:00
a.m. and 10:00 p.m.) (ACT III), cert. denied sub nom. Pacifica, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996).
280. See ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1338-40; ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1509; ACT III, 58 F.3d at

659.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

See ACT 111, 58 F.3d at 659.
See id. at 669.
See Denver Area, 518 US. at 740; id. at 775-76 (Souter, J., concurring).
See id. at 784-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 803-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Justice Breyer's balancing approach serves as a tentative
standard for the beginning of a new electronic media age. The
balancing is candid, contextual, and media deferential, and it
yielded, rather than thwarted, protective results in Denver
Area.
D. The FirstAmendment Monism of Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, made a rather startling observation: "The text of
the First Amendment makes no distinction between print,
broadcast, and cable media, but we have done so."2"6 The Justices did not address exactly how the Framers of the
Constitution could have made such a distinction in 1791, but
the statement is an appropriate introduction to the First
Amendment as Justice Thomas' opinion describes it. It is a
world of absolutes, and it is far removed from the world of caution and contingency inhabited by Justice Breyer and Justice
Souter.
Justice Thomas surveyed the Supreme Court's struggle to
identify an appropriate First Amendment standard for cable.2 7
Concluding with ThrnerI, he asserted that Thrner I analogized
the First Amendment status of cable to that accorded the print
media.2 This is a bold claim. Indeed, Justice Thomas' very
statement suggests its vulnerability: "While Members of the
Court [in Turner 11 disagreed about whether the must-carry
rules imposed by Congress were content-based, and therefore
subject to strict scrutiny, there was agreement that cable operators are generally entitled to much the same First
Amendment protection as the print media."2 9
If Thrner I had truly analogized cable to the print media, the
V Court would have declared the must-carry regulations invalid.
Instead, the Court held the must-carry regulations contentneutral and valid 90 as measured by the O'Brien intermediate

286. Id. at 812 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
287. See id. at 812-15 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-

senting in part).
288. See id. at 815 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).

289. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
290.

See TurnerI,512 US. at 661.
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standard of review. 91 Thus, the manipulable nature of the content-based/content-neutral distinction renders questionable
Justice Thomas' assertion that, in Thrner I, the Court adopted
"much of the print [First Amendment] paradigm." 92 Motivated
by an equal dose of wishful thinking, particularly in light of
Trner II, was Justice Thomas' companion assertion that, by
denying application of the Red Lion 93 standard to cable, the
Thrner I Court made some lasting judgments about "the respective First Amendment rights of competing speakers."2 "
For Justice Thomas, the bifurcated character of First
Amendment protection reflected in the Red Lion and
2 9
Tornillo
1 standards were simply wrong.2 Although he did not

assert that the print media standard should govern all the
newly emergent electronic media, Justice Thomas was at least
clear that the Red Lion standard should be confined to broadcasting:
Our First Amendment distinctions between media, dubious from their infancy, placed cable in a doctrinal
wasteland in which regulators and cable operators alike
could not be sure whether cable was entitled to the substantial First Amendment protections afforded the print

291. United States v. O'Brien, 391 US. 367 (1968). For a discussion of O'Brien, see
supra note 46.
292. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 816 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Although in Turner I the Court found the must-carry rules to
be content-neutral, see Turner I, 512 U.S. at 661, it also acknowledged that contentbased regulation of cable should be evaluated under a strict scrutiny standard. See id.
at 642. Therefore, Justice Thomas concluded that the standard of review for content
regulation of cable and content regulation of the print media is now the same, i.e.,
strict scrutiny. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 821 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Turner I, however, demonstrated that the Court
will sometimes view cable regulations as content-neutral. See supra text accompanying notes 259-62. In other words, the content-based versus content-neutral divide in
cable regulation is quite unclear and manipulable. Thus, the attempt to equate the
content regulation of cable to the content regulation of the print media is doubtful
even under the Thomas analysis.
293. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-401 (1969) (relying on the
scarcity rationale).
294. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 816 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
295. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974) (finding that a
"government-enforced right of access" for print media reduces public debate).
296. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 812-13 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
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media or was subject to the more onerous obligations
shouldered by the broadcast media.297
Justice Thomas challenged the idea of a pluralistic First
Amendment. In Justice Thomas' view, the sin of Red Lion was
that the Court "legitimized consideration of the public interest
and emphasized the rights of viewers." 9 ' He stated that such a
view has been routed from cable after Turner I: "It is the operator's right that is preeminent."299 Indeed, Justice Thomas
concluded: "[Wihen there is a conflict, a programmer's asserted
right to transmit over an operator's cable system must give
way to the operator's editorial discretion."3 ®
Justice Breyer's new balancing approach, as discussed
above, 01 provided specific consideration to the access for expression dimension of the cable regulations under review in
Denver Area.3 2 Access rights must be weighed against the free

speech rights of the cable operator. For Justice Thomas, no
First Amendment rights conflicted in Denver Area because the
only rights asserted that merit First Amendment status were
those of the cable operator.0 3 In Denver Area, Thomas noted
that the rationale behind the plurality was not "intuitively obvious" as to why programmers and viewers have any First
Amendment rights.30 " In reality, however, it is not intuitively
obvious that cable operators enjoy the whole panoply of First
Amendment rights either.
The balancing used by Justice Breyer, Justice Thomas
stated, defied the effort in Turner I to achieve a First Amendment standard for cable.0 5 Moreover, this "heretofore unknown
297.

Id. at 813-14 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting

in part) (footnote omitted).
298. Id. at 816 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
299. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

300. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
301. See discussion supra Part II.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 137-41, 178-79, 188-93.
303. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 824 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) ("The First Amendment challenge, if one is to be made,
must come from the party whose constitutionally protected freedom of speech has
been burdened. Viewing the federal access requirements as a whole, it is the cable
operator, not the access programmer, whose speech rights have been infringed."

(footnote omitted)).
304. See id. at 817 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).

305. See id. at 817-18 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Justice Breyer's detailed explanation of why he believes it is 'unwise
and unnecessary' to choose a standard against which to measure petitioners' First
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standard is facially subjective and openly invites balancing of
asserted speech interests to a degree not ordinarily permitted."0 6 Justice Thomas added that although his approach
might be rigid, it was "required by our precedents" and not of
his making."cn The Court's precedents do not, however, recognize only the rights of the communications entity holder. Even
Tornillo did not hold this; it did not hold that the reader of a
newspaper or the person attacked has no rights of free speech
protected by the First Amendment.308 Tornillo held that the
Court could not protect First Amendment rights without government intrusion acting as a censor and without jeopardizing
the editorial autonomy Tornillo found to be a preeminent
value. 309
Justice Thomas insisted that the interests of the parties in
Denver Area were not interests protected by the First Amendment.3 0 To the extent that Breyer's balancing of asserted
speech interests recognized such rights, " Thomas concluded
that it is mistaken doctrine. 12 Thomas devoted the majority of
his opinion to the task of showing that no speech interests, other
than that of the cable operator, were protected.3 3 His project
was clear. He denied the validity of any First Amendment

Amendment claims largely disregards our recent attempt in Turner to define that
standard." (footnote omitted)).
306. Id. at 818 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
307. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
308. See generally Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 US. 241 (1974).
309. See generally id. at 254-58.
310. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 818-19 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
311. See id. at 818 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Thomas declares:
In any event, even if the plurality's balancing test were an appropriate standard, it could only be applied to protect speech interests that, under the
circumstances, are themselves protected by the First Amendment. But, by
shifting the focus to the balancing of "complex" interests, Justice Breyer never
explains whether (and if so, how) a programmer's ordinarily unprotected interest in affirmative transmission of its programming acquires constitutional
significance on leased and public access channels.
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in paxt and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
312. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
313. See generally id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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theory that is instrumental in its objectives and pluralistic in
its coverage or scope.314
In the Denver Area case, cable programmers challenged sections 10(a) and (c) as improper infringements on their free
speech rights.1 i For Justice Thomas, however, the real question was whether the leased and public access obligations
imposed by statute on cable operators improperly restricted
the free speech rights of those cable operators.3 16
Justice Thomas concluded by asserting that leased access
and public access requirements violated Tornillo:
It is one thing to compel an operator to carry leased and
public access speech, in apparent violation of Tornillo, but
it is another thing altogether to say that the First
Amendment forbids Congress to give back part of the operators' editorial discretion, which all recognize as
fundamentally protected, in favor of a broader access
right.
To say that mandatory public access and leased access
channels violate Tornillo would be an extravagant statement.
If the rights of the communications entity's owners were intended to trump all other claims to First Amendment
protection for all media, Tornillo would have been the ideal
occasion to make that statement. The Tornillo Court instead
directed itself to the print media alone and did not so much as
cite Red Lion, the most obvious contrary electronic media
precedent then extant.
Justice Thomas exerted great effort to undermine, on First
Amendment grounds, the constitutionality of legislation imposing leased or public access channel requirements on cable
operators.3 18 In his view, the First Amendment status of leased
access channels is not improved even if one views leased access channels as common carriers: "Whether viewed as the
creation of a common carrier scheme or simply as a regulatory
314. See generally id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
315. See id. at 738-39, 760-61.
316. See id. at 822 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) ("In my view, the constitutional presumption properly runs in favor of the
operators' editorial discretion, and that discretion may not be burdened without a
compelling reason for doing so.").
317. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
318. See id. at 820-24 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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restriction on cable operators' editorial discretion, the net effect is the same: operators' speech rights are restricted to
make room for access programmers."3 19
At first glance, it seems as though Justice Thomas might
have encountered more difficulty asserting the First Amendment invalidity of public access channels. As the plurality and
Justice Kennedy explained, the theory was that a franchisee
receives approval to construct a cable system on the condition that he dedicate some channels to public, educational,
and governmental purposes.3 2' Thus, with respect to public
access channels, the cable operator had no First Amendment
claim because he never controlled those channels in the first
place. On this point, Justice Thomas blended the argument
that cable operators own their franchises with the inapplicability of the public forum doctrine:
Cable systems are not public property. Cable systems are
privately owned and privately managed, and petitioners
point to no case in which we have held that government
may designate private property as a public forum. The
public forum doctrine is a rule governing claims of "a
right of access to public property," and has never been
thought to extend beyond property generally understood
to belong to the government.3 2'
The final part of Justice Thomas' opinion challenged the
First Amendment validity of public access channels:
In no other public forum that we have recognized does a
private entity, owner or not, have the obligation not only
to permit another to speak, but to actually help produce
and then transmit the message on that person's behalf.... [Plublic access requirements, in my view, are a
regulatory restriction on the exercise of cable operators'
editorial discretion, not a transfer of a sufficient property

319. Id. at 825 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
320. See id. at 760-61; id. at 787-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
321. Id. at 827 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44
(1983)) (footnote omitted).
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interest in the channels to support a designation of that
channel as a public forum. 22
In summary, Justice Breyer and Justice Thomas' opinions
are polar opposites. Under Justice Breyer's perspective, existing First Amendment doctrine was insufficiently pluralistic
and inadequately sensitive to the unique issues raised by
newly emerging electronic media.2 3 Justice Thomas, on the
other hand, asserted that First Amendment law in the United
States is too pluralistic, too sensitive to specific media, and in24
sufficiently respectful of First Amendment principles.
IV. A NEW COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
CASE STUDY-THE INTERNET CASE:
RENO V. ACLU
Justice Breyer's balancing approach recognized that First
Amendment standards need to account for the context of the
medium.3 2 5 Even prior to the Denver Area decision, courts
were required to address government regulation of indecency
326
on a new, and very unique, medium-the Internet . ACLU v.
Reno and Shea ex rel. American Reproductions v. Reno3 27 were
challenges to Congressional regulation of indecency on the
Internet. These cases served as the basis for the United
States Supreme Court's review of a First Amendment challenge to Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, also
known as the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 328 in Reno
v. ACLU.329 The CDA prohibited the knowing transmission of
obscene or indecent messages on the Internet to anyone under eighteen years of age.330 In addition, the CDA prohibited

322. Id. at 829-31 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 97, 103-16.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 101, 298-300, 303-04.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 97, 103-16.
326. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997).
327. 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
328. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 133 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(e)); see Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2337-39.
329. 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997).
330. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a). Section 223(a) provides in pertinent part:
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knowingly sending or displaying patently offensive messages
in a manner which made the messages available to anyone
under eighteen years of age. 331 A three-judge district court

Whoever--(1) in interstate or foreign communications... (B) by means of a
telecommunications device knowingly-(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii)
initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the
recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether
the maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the communication; ... (2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his
control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent
that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.
Id.
331. See id. § 223(d). Section 223(d) provides:
Whoever--(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-(A) uses an
interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18
years of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the
user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or (2)
knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control
to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be
used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both.
Id.
Congress included in section 223 two affirmative defenses to subsections (a) and
(d). See id. § 223(e)(5). Section 223(e)(5) provides:
It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(1)(B) or (d) of this section,
or under subsection (a)(2) of this section with respect to the use of a facility for
an activity under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section that a person-(A) has
taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the
circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication specified in such subsections, which may involve any appropriate measures to
restrict minors from such communications, including any method which is feasible under available technology, or (B) has restricted access to such
communication by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult
access code, or adult personal identification number.
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panel struck down these provisions,332 and the Supreme Court
resoundingly affirmed.3 33
Justice Breyer did not write an opinion in Reno. Instead,
he joined Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court. Justice Stevens' opinion in Reno was a fact-specific and media-specific
decision. 34 Is it compatible with Justice Breyer's opinions in
Turner II and Denver Area? Justice Stevens' opinion in Reno is
extremely attentive to the nature and character of the Internet
as a new electronic medium,335 and the media context is as central in his analysis as it was in Justice Breyer's opinions. The
nature of a new communications technology, cable television,
was used to excuse a departure from First Amendment doctrine in Denver Area,336 while in Reno, the nature of a new
communications technology was used to justify the application
of existing First Amendment doctrine.33 7 Note, however, that
the Court's use of existing First Amendment doctrine-strict
scrutiny-is not as significant as it may appear at first
blush.
In Reno, Justice Stevens took considerable pains to distinguish the unique character of the broadcast media, and its
332. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1996). This suit, challenging the constitutionality of sections 223(a)(1) and 223(d), was filed against Attorney
General Janet Reno by "various organizations and individuals who ... are associated
with the computer and/or communications industries, or who publish or post materials on the Internet, or belong to various citizen groups." Id. at 827. The suit alleged
that the CDA infringed on the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to publish indecent
material, in addition to chilling the publication of decent material. See id.
Each judge on the panel filed an opinion based on a different theory of why the
CDA was unconstitutional. See id. at 849-57 (Sloviter, C.J.) (holding that the CDA is
not narrowly tailored and "that the CDA reaches speech subject to the full protection
of the First Amendment, at least for adults"); id. at 857-65 (Buckwalter, J.) (holding
that the CDA was vague and did not adequately define the type of conduct subject to
criminal sanction); id. at 865-83 (Dalzell, J.) (focusing on the nature of the Internet
and concluding that regulation of speech on the Internet should be scrutinized under
the strictest standard).
333. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351.
334. See id. at 2342-43 (rejecting analogizing the Internet to broadcasting and
recognizing that "'[each medium of expression ... may present its own problems'"
(quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975))).
335. See id. at 2334-36, 2343-44. Justice Stevens goes to considerable lengths to
distinguish the Internet from other media. See id. at 2343-44 (distinguishing the Internet from broadcasting because it is not subject to the same scarcity restrictions). In
discussing the nature of the Internet, Justice Stevens concludes that "[the Internet]
constitute[s] a unique medium-known to its users as 'cyberspace'-located in no
particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with
access to the Internet." Id. at 2334-35.
336. See discussion supra Part I.A.
337. See infra text accompanying notes 363-65.
338. See infra text accompanying note 372.
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susceptibility to regulation, from other media.339 Justice Stevens distinguished television and radio from the Internet at
the outset: "Unlike communications received by radio and
television, 'the receipt of information on the Internet requires
a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than
merely turning a dial. A child requires some sophistication and
some ability to retrieve material and thereby use the Internet
unattended."' 40 Justice Stevens relied on his statement, made
nearly twenty years ago in Pacifica, "that 'of all forms of communication' broadcasting had received the most limited First
Amendment protection."" The rationale for according broadcasting more limited protection than other media was that
warnings cannot shield the listener "from unexpected program
342
content."
Justice Stevens took equally great care in Reno to describe
the technology of the Internet. Unlike broadcasting, the Internet had no comparable regulatory history, and its technological
character was not similar to other media.4 3 The likelihood of
surprise by unwanted content on the Internet was remote due
to the "series of affirmative steps" necessary to access such
material.4
In Denver Area, Justice Breyer concluded that the possibility of a child being surprised by indecent material was equally
great on cable and broadcasting. 45 Yet Reno mentioned neither
Justice Breyer's analysis of the pervasiveness of cable television nor the holding of pre-Denver Area courts that the
affirmative steps necessary to be a cable subscriber justified
distinguishing cable from broadcasting and for avoiding the
reach of the Pacifica decision." Instead, the idea which
339. See id. at 2341-44 ("Neither before nor after the enactment of the CDA have
the vast democratic fora of the Internet been subject to the type of government supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry.").
340. Id. at 2336 (quotingACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 845).
341. Id. at 2342 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49).
342. Id.
343. See id. (noting that in Pacifica,"the Commission's order applied to a medium
[broadcasting] which as a matter of history had 'received the most limited First
Amendment protection,'" (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748), but that the Internet
"has no comparable history").
344. See id.
345. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 744 ("Cable television broadcasting, including
access channel broadcasting, is as 'accessible to children' as over-the-air broadcasting,
if not more so.").
346. Cf Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420-21 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that Pacifica was inapplicable in the cable context because a cable subscriber must take
affirmative actions to subscribe and select the programming to be viewed).
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pervades Reno was that broadcasting alone is uniquely intrusive and uniquely pervasive3. 7 "Those factors are not present
in cyberspace." s Yet if Internet use is pervasive among any
sector of the population, it seems intuitively to be pervasive
among the young.
A. Justice Stevens: PreservingAccess
The technology of the Internet, Justice Stevens concluded,
infuses it with a democratic character.34 9 In this regard, he
relied on the opinion of Judge Dalzell in the lower court. In
particular, Judge Dalzell focused on the question of what
constitutes an appropriate First Amendment standard of review for the Internet.35 ° Without specifically endorsing Judge
Dalzell's analysis, Justice Stevens was clearly intrigued by it.
Judge Dalzell's theory suggested that the greater the ability of
an electronic medium to provide public access, the greater its
claim to First Amendment protection.3 5'
347. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342-43.
348. Id. at 2343.
349. See id. at 2344. Justice Stevens declares:
Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a
town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.
Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer. As the District Court found, "the content on
the Internet is as diverse as human thought."
Id. (quotingACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 842).
350. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 872-83.
351. See id. at 880-81. Judge Dalzell traces the efforts of critics who argue that
the marketplace of ideas fails because the market is controlled by the people who own
the media. See id. at 879-80. He notes that the Supreme Court, although having recognized that access to the media is unequal, see Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 248-50 (1974), has refrained from allowing government to regulate the
media in a manner that would correct the market failure-i.e., a regulation that
would allow broader access to the media and the tools of speech. See ACLU, 929 F.
Supp. at 880 ("Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has resisted governmental efforts to
alleviate these market dysfunctions.").
In analyzing the Court's view towards market dysfunction arguments and applying
access concerns to the Internet, Judge Dalzell declares:
Both Tornillo and Turner recognize, in essence, that the cure for market dysfunction (government-imposed, content-based speech restrictions) will almost
always be worse than the disease. Here, however, I am hard-pressed even to
identify the disease. It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has
achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory marketplace of mass
speech that this country-and indeed the world-has yet seen. The plaintiffs in
these actions correctly describe the "democratizing" effects of Internet commu-
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Justice Stevens summarized Judge Dalzell's construction of

"our cases as requiring a 'medium-specific' approach to the
analysis of the regulation of mass communication, and
[Dalzell] concluded that the Internet-'the most participatory
form of mass speech yet developed'-is entitled to the 'highest
protection from governmental intrusion."'3 52 Judge Dalzell
found four characteristics of the Internet which underly the
conclusion that Congress could not regulate indecency on the
Internet at all. 353 First, the Internet presented very low barriers to entry; second, the barriers were identical for listeners
and speakers; third, an "astoundingly diverse content" was viable on the Internet as a result of the low barriers; and finally,
the Internet provides access to all speakers. 4
The law of print, broadcast, and cable media is replete with
cases rejecting the access claims of those who are turned away
by media gatekeepers. 5 Lack of access is no problem on the
Internet; instead, access is the mode of the Internet."'6 This
nication: individual citizens of limited means can speak to a worldwide audience on issues of concern to them.
Id. at 881.
Judge Dalzell concludes:
[I]f the goal of our First Amendment jurisprudence is the "individual dignity
and choice" that arises from "putting the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely into the hands of each of us," then we should be especially vigilant in preventing content-based regulation of a medium that every minute
allows individual citizens actually to make those decisions.
Id. at 881-82 (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1991)) (citation
omitted).
352. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2340 (quoting ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 883) (citations omitted).
353. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 877.
354. See id.
355. See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 700 (1979) (holding that
FCC rules imposing public access requirements on cable systems were invalid because
the FCC was without authority to issue them); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 254 (1974) (holding a newspaper right of reply statute violated freedom
of the press); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 12021 (1973) (holding that the First Amendment did not of its own force provide for a
right of access to the broadcast media).
For a rare case where access requirements were upheld, see CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453
U.S. 367, 396-97 (1981) (holding that a federal statute creating a right of "reasonable
access" for federal political candidates on broadcasting enhanced rather than restricted freedom of expression). The previously cited cases were distinguished on the
ground that the statute in CBS created a limited rather than a general right of access.
See id.
356. See Jim Carlton & Evan Ramstad, Cheaper PCs Sell Briskly, CI. SUNTIMES, Sept. 18, 1997, at 37 (noting that Internet penetration in the United States is
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might support an argument that government may not regulate
the Internet at all, but Justice Stevens failed to decide that
issue because it was not raised by the parties.357 Indeed, the
parties acknowledged that the government had a compelling
interest in protecting minors from indecent and patently offensive speech.358
Unlike broadcasting, the Internet has developed as an unregulated communications medium. 59 Whereas scarcity
necessitated the traditional First Amendment standard for
36 1
broadcasting,3 0 the Internet is not a "scarce" medium at all.
Therefore, no basis exists for "qualifying the level of First
Amendment
scrutiny that should be applied to this medium. ,,362
Justice Stevens agreed with the district court that there was
no "effective way to determine the age of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups,
or chat rooms."3"3 Thus, while the only way to effectively bar
minors was to deprive adults of access to material subject to
First Amendment protection,3 " far more narrowly tailored alternatives were available to restrict access to indecent speech
to minors without denying it altogether to adults.365
In Reno, the Court decided to leave an unregulated medium
unregulated: "As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage

around 38% to 40%); InternationalTelecommunication Union: New ITU Report Tracks
Internet Growth and Development, M2 Presswire, Sept. 15, 1997, available in LEXIS,
Market Library, IACNWS File (stating that the number of Internet users worldwide is
around sixty million).
357. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2340 n.30. Judge Dalzell believed that the four characteristics of the Internet described in the text warranted the conclusion that the
Internet could not be regulated at all. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 877.
358. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2340 n.30.
359. See id. at 2343.
360. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
361. See Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2344 ("[Ulnlike the conditions that prevailed when
Congress first authorized regulation of the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can
hardly be considered a 'scarce' expressive commodity. It provides relatively unlimited,
low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds.").
362. Id.
363. Id. at 2347 (citing ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 845).
364. See id. at 2346 ("In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful
speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a
constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.").
365. See id. at 2348.
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it." 366 This laissez-faire conclusion of the Reno Court is consistent with Justice Souter's wise counsel in the Denver Area
case: for law as for medicine, the first rule should be to do no
harm.36 7
The cable cases-Turner I, Thrner II, and Denver Area-pit
classes of speakers against each other. Cable programmers,
broadcasters, and system operators all compete with each other
to protect their First Amendment interests.36 The cable cases
also involve the additional and often competing interests of
viewers.369 Reno reviewed a restrictive piece of government censorship to which virtually every on-line service, computer, and
media organization was opposed.370 When an on-line case which
presents a conflict among competing private interests comes
before the Court, the Court will be forced to clarify the application of First Amendment doctrine to the Internet.3 71 The Reno
Court applied strict scrutiny because there was no justification
for the all-encompassing nature of the governmental restraint,3 72
and it would be a mistake to conclude that strict scrutiny will
apply universally to all Internet regulation. A rational basis test
would have yielded the same result, as the all-encompassing
nature of the ban imposed by the CDA was irrational-it was
self-evidently undiscriminating for the accomplishment of even
legitimate governmental interests.
B. Justice O'Connor:Prophecy of Regulation
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurred in the judgment in Reno in part and also dissented in

366. Id. at 2351.
367. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 778 (Souter, J., concurring).
368. See discussion supra Parts I.B, II.
369. See id.
370. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2339 nn.27-28.
371. A possible example of conflicting private-party interests may arise as a result
of litigation against America Online for libel. See Karen Breslau, A Capital Cyber
Clash, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 27, 1997, at 63 (discussing a $30 million libel suit against
America Online for allowing a user to post a defamatory statement). If the courts were
to begin making on-line services responsible for content placed onto the Internet by
their subscribers, on-line services would take a more proactive role in censoring users'
views. This would result in the empowerment of the owners of the medium to censor
subscribers' messages. In such circumstances, the question of whether there is a right
of access to the Internet would have to be confronted.
372. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346-48.
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part.173 Her quarrel with Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court
was that it was too unqualified. Justice O'Connor argued that
eventually cyberspace will be zoned. 74 These zones would
grant entry to adults but not to children, adult bookstores or
adult theaters being examples of such "zones" in physical or
geographic space. 371 Such zones, she declared, are valid. 371 Justice O'Connor viewed the CDA provisions as an attempt to
create such zones. 3 77 Justice O'Connor asserted that gateway
technology will allow the government to create adult-only
zones on the Internet someday.37 8 When that day arrives,
regulation directed at children found in some of the provisions
of the CDA will be valid. 379 These provisions are invalid now
because cyberspace is currently, as far as most of its users are
concerned, unzoned. 3' Gateway technology will change this,
and the regulation of indecent content directed toward children will ultimately be as valid in cyberspace as it is now in
physical space.38 '
Justice O'Connor criticized Justice Stevens' opinion because
the opinion neither "'accept[s] nor reject[s]' the argument that
the CDA is facially overbroad."3 2 She believes the CDA should
373. See id. at 2351 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
374. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
375. See id. at 2352-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
376. See id. at 2353 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("That is to say, a zoning law is valid if (i) it does not unduly restrict
adult access to the material; and (ii) minors have no First Amendment right to read or
view the banned material.").
377. See id. at 2351 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
378. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
379. See id. at 2354 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
380. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
381. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice O'Connor believed that when screening software and other means of
controlling gateways are perfected, then it would be constitutionally permissible for
the government to require Internet providers to zone access to adult content. See id.
at 2353-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
382. Id. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Justice O'Connor's opinion does not reject a medium-specific standard. Justice O'Connor frankly declared that "[allthough the prospects for the eventual zoning
of the Internet appear promising, I agree with the Court that [it]
must evaluate the
constitutionality of the CDA as it applies to the Internet as it exists today." Id. at 2354
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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5 5 3 Under Ginshave been specifically acquitted of overbreadth.
berg v. New York,'" "minors may constitutionally be denied
access to material that is obscene as to minors," but adults

may not.!"5
Justice O'Connor stated that regulation will ultimately come
to the Internet, and she wanted the Court in Reno to concede
this.3 86 Yet despite this invitation, Justice Stevens declined to
so qualify his opinion.
C. The FirstAmendment Significance of Reno v. ACLU
The Stevens opinion in Reno can be viewed as an effort to
mirror the status of the Internet as a technology in First
Amendment law. Bottlenecks or gatekeepers may be inevitable
in cable systems because a single operator or entity operates
or controls a system. They may be inevitable in VHF television
as well because the finite nature of the spectrum limits the
number of VHF licenses. Conversely, the Internet is open to all
comers-both as speakers and as viewers.8 7
Professor Sunstein, writing before the Reno opinion, argued
that, with respect to the Internet and cyberspace, the Court

383. See id. at 2355 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
384. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
385. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
386. See id. at 2357 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Regulation may come to the Internet because government may be
called upon to mediate battles over content and access among private actors. The
Anti-Defamation League is planning to distribute software to screen out anti-semitic
Websites. See Amy Harmon, Highway Patrol: The Self-Appointed Cops of the Information Age, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1997, § 4, at 1. The Catholic Information Center, an
Internet Service Provider (ISP), is also developing a rating system. See id. The purpose of these rating systems is to block out objectionable content, while filtering
systems are being developed to block out software. See id. The makers of these systems do not inform Internet users which Web Sites are being blocked. See id.
The World Wide Web Consortium has designed a filtering system, Platform for Internet Content Selection, which has been criticized by Professor Lawrence Lessig as
"hav[ing] the power to grant liberties or encode them away." Id. Software filters developed to screen out objectionable content may have the same effect as the most
pervasive and censorious government regulation. The Internet's mode now is access,
but it is questionable whether this will remain so. The government may have to develop rules to prevent software content filters from transforming the Internet from a
free market to one characterized by newly developed bottlenecks-silent software
filter systems.
387. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334.
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should be casuistic, highly specific, and avoid broad rulings. 88
Justice Stevens' opinion was consistent with part of this advice. If a type of technology is a fact, Reno is highly fact
specific. Indeed, as was the case with Justice Breyer's opinions
in Denver Area and Turner II, Reno is highly technology specific. Beyond that, it is medium-specific. 39 But the Stevens
opinion in the Internet case is not casuistic, but situational.
The true First Amendment significance of the Reno opinion,
therefore, is that the government should leave the Internet as
it found it-free of regulation-at least for this moment. Unlike other electronic media, the Internet is not characterized
by market failure."' On the contrary, its pervasive and
3 1 transforming characteristic is its offer of immediate access.
In Reno, Justice Stevens found the government's censorship
to be too destructive of adults' access rights. As gateways develop and zones appear, it may be that the Internet will be
viewed as less responsive to access rights altogether.3 9 2 For
Justice Stevens, there was no need to write a decision providing a conclusive rule of First Amendment governance for the
Internet. In this respect, the considerations implicitly balanced
in Reno are very similar to the explicit balancing undertaken
by Breyer in Turner II and DenverArea.

CONCLUSION

Recent First Amendment doctrine-the rise of the strict scrutiny standard and the content-based versus content-neutral
test-has progressed toward exclusion of all considerations

388. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361,
362-63 (1996).
389. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2340 (observing with apparent approval that Judge
Dalzell in the lower court construed the Supreme Court's First Amendment cases as
'medium-specific").
390. See Sunstein, supra note 388, at 361.
391. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334-36.
392. As ISPs develop blocking technology that restricts access to various zones,
adult access to information may be impeded not by government regulation but by
private parties. In addition, the manner in which the Internet content marketplace is
developing may restrict Internet users' ability to enter certain websites simply because of the software browser they use. An example of this is Microsoft's contracting
with certain websites to only allow users who have Microsoft's browser to enter. See
New Media, COMM. DAILY, Nov. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13780745. If this trend
continues, the inclusive and participatory character of the Internet as a medium may
change and the role of access as a First Amendment right will have to be considered.
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other than whether content is being regulated. Consequently,
the competing First Amendment interests involved are often
obscured.
Justice Breyer's new balancing approach identifies the players affected by a regulation. Whereas Justice Thomas believes
that only the owner of a medium has any valid First Amendment interests, Justice Breyer recognizes that new media may
create new players who have First Amendment interests. The
new balancing is more inclusive; the First Amendment interests of all relevant parties are accorded recognition. Note,
however, that not all parties affected by a regulation have
First Amendment interests.
An explicit example of the new balancing approach is Thrner
H."' In Turner H, Justice Breyer recognized the First Amendment interests of cable operators, cable programmers, overthe-air broadcasters, and over-the-air viewers. An analysis
that identifies all relevant First Amendment interests makes
it more likely that these interests will be addressed and will
transcend the traditional cursory analysis that recognizes only
the First Amendment interests of the media owner.
In addition, the new balancing analyzes the First Amendment interests in the context of the medium to which the
government regulation is being applied. In Pacifica, the broadcasting context involved factors such as pervasiveness and
ease of access that the Court considered. In Denver Area, the
cable context involved factors like pervasiveness, ease of access, a balancing of four players' interests (the cable operator,
the cable programmer, the cable subscriber, and the government), and the natural evolution of technology towards less
restrictive methods of regulating.394
Turner II and Reno provide perhaps the best examples of
the significance of accounting for the media context. In Turner
H, the Court had to consider the cable medium and its
relationship to broadcasting. One important aspect of cable is
that it directly competes with free over-the-air broadcasting
for both advertisers and viewers. This aspect was especially
important in analyzing the effects cable has on the viability of
local broadcasters. In Reno, the Internet context involved
factors that included the necessity of taking affirmative steps
to obtain indecent material, the traditionally free atmosphere
that permeates the Internet, an individual's ability to
393.
394.

See discussion supra Part I.
See discussion supra Part II.A, C-D.
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disseminate his or her ideas to a vast number of people, and
the evolution towards zones. 95
The new balancing recognizes that First Amendment interests conflict and must compete for recognition. No speaker is
presumptively preferred over another or over subscribers/viewers. The new balancing approach differs from the old
balancing test in that the governmental restraint does not
necessarily receive deference, yet the calculus is not necessarily capricious.
The interests most jeopardized by government regulation
are those the new balancing seeks to protect. In Denver Area,
section 10(a) of the 1992 Cable Act promoted the cable operator's interest in editorial control. The only interest in jeopardy
was that of the leased access cable programmers', yet section
10(a) was a proper balance between cable operator's editorial
interests and programmers' interests. Section 10(b), however,
jeopardized operators', programmers', and viewers' interests.
Section 10(b) inhibited operators' editorial control, obstructed
programmers' ability to have their programming viewed, and
infringed on viewers' abilities to choose what programming
entered their homes. Section 10(b) was not a proper balance
among the First Amendment interests at stake.
In Thrner II, the Court viewed the challenged must-carry
requirements as striking a balance among cable operators, cable programmers, local over-the-air broadcasters, and free
over-the-air broadcasting viewers. By acknowledging that
over-the-air broadcasters and over-the-air broadcasting viewers' interests were in dire jeopardy of being extinguished, the
government could require cable operators to designate a minor
number of channels.
In his cable opinions, Justice Breyer displays a number of
characteristics that are worthy of attention. First, he is willing
to consider an instrumental approach to First Amendment issues, as he disagrees with the conclusion of some of his
colleagues that the government has no role to play in accomplishing First Amendment objectives. Second, he understands
that both parties to the controversy often have First Amendment interests at stake in such cases. In other words, he
understands that interests and values protected by the First
Amendment often conflict with each other. Third, he is properly skeptical about established First Amendment doctrine.
Fourth, his approach to First Amendment issues is a candid
395. See discussion supra Part IV.

SUMNER 1998]

The ElectronicMedia

885

one; he will express any First Amendment costs tied to a particular result which he favors. Note that the approaches of
Justices Souter and Stevens share these characteristics as
well.
Doctrinal constructs to govern the electronic media at this
point should be sufficiently elastic and flexible to permit
courts to change course if the facts and the technology change
radically. When dealing with the electronic media, radical
change should be expected. Rather than molding these media
to fit doctrinal dogmas, the role of First Amendment doctrine
should be to respond to communications realities as they unfold.
The role of the individual in controversies like Turner and
Denver Area is a blurred and distant one. These cases are not
cases about regulations that hamper individuals from fully
expressing their ideas and beliefs. These are cases about cable operators who control a bottleneck. The issue is whether
the First Amendment should be interpreted to allow them to
control it completely or not. Mechanical use of a contentbased or a content-neutral inquiry results in the invalidation
of legislation as long as the regulation can be found to be content-based. The result of this exercise typically leaves the
owners of the communications entity involved in complete control. The use of this inquiry also obscures the First Amendment
interests of the other players. Thus, the controversy is presented
simply as one between the communications operator and the
government; and the programmers, community groups, and individual citizens served by the government regulation are
removed from view. Justice Breyer's new balancing approach
puts them back in First Amendment focus.

